Skip to main content
Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire on a hydrogen pipe of a refinery

Event

Event ID
1192
Quality
Description
This incident occurred at a refinery, on a pipe transporting hydrogen at 24 bar placed at 6 m above ground. A 15 cm long hydrogen flame was detected at an anti-leak system temporarily installed on the pipe to prevent a leak on a damaged valve. This temporary system had been installed a year earlier, to allow continuation of the operation, avoiding the need of a shut-down of the whole unit.
The crisis unit and the emergency plan were activated. Internal response teams set up a safety perimeter. Units were put on standby to isolate and decompress the section. The leak was stopped after 3 hours.
The excess hydrogen produced by the unit was sent to the flare network pending repairs. Leak tests were performed on the isolation valves of the line section. The temporary system was removed, and the leaking valve, which was not required for operation, was removed. The emergency plan 8 hours after the start of the emergency.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Main component involved?
Valve (Generic)
How was it involved?
Leak & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Unknown
Root causes
Unknown (No additional details provided)

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
unspecified
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
valve, pipe
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The temporary system had been installed a year earlier. This so-called “leak-in-operating” device is a temporary device installed on a leak in an industrial facility, such as a pipe or valve, to allow for a safer repair, often avoiding a shutdown of the facility.
These systems are subject to strict procedures, including risk analysis and equipment monitoring, and must be replaced with a permanent repair during the first scheduled shutdown, or at the latest by the regulatory deadline.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
0
Property loss (onsite)
0
Property loss (offsite)
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The event description is mainly based on local news information, and lack of the required technical details to extract a specific lesson learnt.
The consequences have been rather limited, the emergency actions were effective, nobody was injured and there was no impact outside the fence.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to formulate the following reflection:
(1) At the origin of the series of event there was a leaking. A temporary leak-in-operating had been installed to avoid the immediate shut-down of the industrial process.
(2) The incident occurred a year after the device had been installed.
(3) The leak-in-operating solution is a temporary solution, which must be replaced with a permanent repair during the first scheduled shutdown.
(4) Clearly, the design and/or the installation of this device was not enough to guarantee leak-free operation for such a long time.

Event Nature

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2
Release duration
unknown
Actual pressure (MPa)
2.4
Design pressure (MPa)
2.4
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Deflagration
n
High pressure explosion
n
High voltage explosion
n
Flame type
jet flame
Flame length (m)
0.15 m

References

Reference & weblink

Event no.62767 of the French database ARIA <br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/62767/<br />
(accessed December 2024)

JRC assessment