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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Conventional fire on a CGH2 trailer

Event

Event ID
1142
Quality
Description
A CGH2 tube trailer-tractor was travelling to deliver hydrogen to a customer, when a fire developed on right side of the tractor around the rear of the hood and passenger side door. Very quickly the entire power unit was engulfed in flames.
The driver called 911. The highway was closed.
Approximately 30 minutes later, the fire had spread to the tractor drive tires on the passenger side causing extreme heat on the bottom tubes of the trailer. Hydrogen began to leak and ignited. The fire continued to burn slowly until customer personnel lowered the pressure in the tube, which stopped the flow of gas and the fire self-extinguished.
The units were released to a towing company approximately 7 hours later.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Piping (Trailer)
How was it involved?
Leak & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Over-Heating (Conventional Fire)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was a conventional fire from tractor components (similar incidents reported the brakes as the source of the over-heating).

The fact that the burst discs did not appear having failed indicated that the pressure inside the tubes was not affected by the heat. It has been preliminary concluded that a component part of the pressure control system of the tube failed under fire or heat, very likely the bull plug of of one of the tube, and more specifically the seal between the bull plug and the cylinder end melted and caused the leak. It indicate as ROOT CAUSE a safety design unable to consider this type of fire and to protect critical compoent from it.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
seal
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT
The trailer was carrying 10 tubes. On each tube end, a bull plug was installed, with an internal burst disk assembly screwed into it.
The hydrogen trasport capacity was 325 kg
The transported quantity when the incident occurred was 255 kg

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
148650
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
only a limited amount of hydrogen was lost: the PHMSA source reports 5 kg.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt
The conventional brake fire which started this incident did not produce a heat input to the CGH2 tubes to cause their internal pressure to raise above the limit set by the pressure relief system. The burst disc did not open. The only damage caused by the fire was to a seal fitting, which caused a leak with limited consequences.
Nevertheless, other cases started with conventional fires caused the venting of the whole hydrogen load, because the pressure relief valve were not activated. Such a scenario must be avoided when the trailers are in a confined space, such as a tunnel. Moreover, tubes components critical to safety shall be well protected from fires and heat.
Finally, better quality control and inspection are required for conventional components of a truck, which may play a critical role in affecting the hydrogen load transported. A conventional fire on brakes could cause a total loss to the vehicle, but in presence of a flammable gas, it could have much heavier consequences.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
5.1
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Incident I-2014020207 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment