Event
- Event ID
- 1126
- Quality
- Description
- An empty LH2 trailer was travelling back to the base to load new LH2, when one of the truck tyre (the inner tire on the driver’s side rear axle) blew causing sparks and smoke. The driver pulled over to the side of the highway and tried to extinguish the starting fire by a fire extinguisher. Since was not able to extinguish completely the fire, he reported the incident to the emergency number.
Due to the heat of he fire, the pressure rose inside the LH2 tank and the Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) activated releasing hydrogen gas into the atmosphere through the vent stack. The vented hydrogen ignited, developing fire at the vent stack. The first responders were able to extinguish the fire by using a helium fire abatement system. Meanwhile the pressure inside the trailer had decreased below the PSV activation value, however the PSV did not reseat. Therefore, the hydrogen continued to slowly escape out of the vent stack.
6 hours later, a company employee arrived to the site performed a controlled venting, to reduce the pressure to a safe level and to allow the PSV to reclose. The intervention was successful and the pressure reduced from approximately 170 psi (11.7 bar) to 3-5 psi (0.2 – 0.3 bar). - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Prd (Valve)
- How was it involved?
- Correct Activation
- Initiating cause
- Over-Heating (Conventional Fire)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIAL CAUSE was a conventional fire on a truck tyre, which increased the temperature and consequently the pressure of the LH2 tank.
The pressure control system of the trailer functioned as expected. The fire fighting strategy was successful.
Nevertheless, regular inspections, and maintenance and replacement procedures are in place for critical components of heavy duty vehicles. Theese measures should be able to prevent negative consequences to the rest of the system. This is even more important for hazardous material transports. Shortcoming in these procedures could be suggested as ROOT CAUSE.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- LH2 tanker
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- burst disc, vent
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- A conventional fire started on the truck, initiating the series of events.
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
- DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT
The nominal capacity of the trailer was 10500 gallons (2800 kg of LH2)
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 60000
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- The LH2 was almost empty. 80 kg were assessed as vented.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Released amount
- 80.450416351249
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 1.2
- Design pressure (MPa)
- <1.0
- Presumed ignition source
- Open flame
References
- Reference & weblink
Incident E-2013100402 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- PHMSA