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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over pressurisation of a LH2 trailer

Event

Event ID
1119
Quality
Description
A LH2 trailer/truck had delivered liquid hydrogen to a customer site and was travelling back empty to the base. The drivers noticed an increase in trailer pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vent open while traveling on the road, they moved to an isolated area, parked and performed a controlled, manual venting of the trailer. The pressure was stabilised and they returned o the base without further incident.

The trailer was found to have a deteriorated vacuum, and repaired.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Lh2 Tanker
How was it involved?
Manual Venting
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Thermal Insulation Degradation)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIAL CAUSE was over-pressurisation of the LH2 tank, which triggered the need of a venting.
The ROOT or INTERMEDIATE CAUSE was a loss of the thermal insulation capacity of the tank, due to deterioration of the vacuum between the external and internal shells of the LH2 tank.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
vacuum thermal insulation
Location type
Open
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
225
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
The emergency was handled by the drivers, by performing a manual venting to stabilise the internal tank pressure. It is unclear what this stabilisation consisted. Since the thermal insulation ability was deteriorated, it is to expected that the pressure would increased again once the vent was closed. probably, the tank was completely emptied.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
8.3802517032551
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Incident I-2003071007 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment