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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Leakage at a hydrogen refilling station in a airport

Event

Event ID
1064
Quality
Description
This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station.
Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off.
An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm.
The leak was located on the compressor’s filter. This filter was located in a restricted and confined space controlled by a gas detector. The detector triggered the alarm because the concentration of hydrogen in the atmosphere had reached its safety limit (25% of the lower explosive limit). Nevertheless the amount of dispersed hydrogen have been very low. The defective filter was replaced.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Main component involved?
Compressor / Booster / Pump
How was it involved?
Leak
Initiating cause
Unknown
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The initiating cause of the event was a loss of confinement of a gasket inside the filter of the hydrogen compressor.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Refuelling Station
Sub-application
HRS
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Compression (No additional details provided)
All components affected
Compressors, filter, gasket
Location type
Open
Location description
Airport Or Airborne
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
Approximately one month before, another hydrogen leak had affected the same HRS (See HIAD 1063)

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Property loss (onsite)
0
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
The supplier was officially contacted to identify the causes of this loss of tightness. The station was put not back in service till the supplier replied.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

Following the event, the airport operator asked the hydrogen station operator:
• to inform local companies of risk management at hydrogen production facilities;
• to adjust the on-site intervention of technicians according to the need of the local companies.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

JRC assessment