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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Hydrogen explosion in a foundry.

Event

Event ID
981
Quality
Description

The event occurred in the continuous casting of hot metallic melt of the plant.
Cooling water leaked through a crack in the cooling water inlet pipe of a secondary cooling line and directly into the hot melt (temperature > 1500 °C). This resulted in the formation of hydrogen which ignited on the hot surface.
The pipe in question had been in operation for a prolonged period. The material analyses of the component showed that the rupture occurred as a consequence of fatigue. The annual visual inspection had revealed no signs of imminent failure.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Germany
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause was the leaking of cooling water onto the melted metal, which produced hydrogen by thermolysis, followed by its ignition.
The root cause was probably a design or inspection deficit, because the cooling pipe failed due ageing due to fatigue.

Facility

Application
Steel And Metals Industry
Sub-application
generic metal processing
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
casting unit, water cooling pipe
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The annual visual inspection had revealed no signs of imminent failure.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt
(database ProcessNet)
In order to effectively avoid such an event in future, the following points should be remembered:
(1) The discussion of potential hazard sources should include a sufficiently wide range of possibilities to ensure the safe management of the process.
(2) Cooling water connection points should be fitted with a splash protector, if hazardous conditions can be created by escaping leakage water.
(3) In presence of fatigue stress, it should be critically evaluated whether components are suitably designed and monitored.
(4) Fatigue-affected components should be inspected for fatigue damage by means of dye penetration method or ultrasound.

Event Nature

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
water
H2
Presumed ignition source
Hot surface

References

Reference & weblink

Event description in the DECHEMA database ProcessNet (accessed October 2021)

JRC assessment