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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire at a hydrotreater of a refinery

Event

Event ID
977
Quality
Description
This incident occurred at a unit designed to convert heavy oil residues into refined products. It involved a fluidized bed reactor and the related hydrogen supply system serving the optimisation of the catalytic conversion insider the reactor.
Note: there are two versions of the events. eMARS and MARSH (see references). They agree in identifying triggering event the trip of a hydrogen compressor. They diverge however about the following steps and their causes. The version presented here is the one provided by the European eMARS database, because based on the results of an investigation.
The accident was probably triggered by a mechanical failure of regulation of a secondary supply line from the compressor which was providing the reactor with hydrogen. The supply line providing the reactor with hydrogen gas was at 160 bar and 500 °C. The rupture caused a hydrogen leak, which ignited and formed a horizontal jet fire. The flame was located at an elevation of about 8 m from ground level that affected other components and equipment.
The rupture occurred close to a valve in the hydrogen pipe with clamp connectors, in the vicinity of the reactors. The causes of the rupture were identified as being the result of anomalous operation of the facility due to reduced/non-existent hydrogen flow that led to cooling by natural convection and consequent thermal stress. The loss of flow in the pipe occurred because of a compressor becoming blocked and a second compressor reducing to minimal flow.
The fire then caused some other components in the facility to rupture, leading to a partial release of hydrocarbons. This was also the result of the malfunctioning of a cut-off valve when operated manually, probably because of a power cut owing to the power supply panel being affected by the fire.
There was also a fire near the air coolers that broke out when the facility was depressurised rapidly because of stresses in excess of those designed for.
The quantities involved were 70 t of hydrocarbon and 0.3 t of hydrogen.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Italy
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING/direct cause was a mechanical failure, which caused a series of additional failures. Two sources diverge on the exact reasons of these failures, but are bot pointing at the same type of causes.
Human errors and procedures and management shortcoming are the root cause, because procedures had not been followed and incorrect mitigating operations were undertaking on a series of failing components.

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
hydrogen compression
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
hydrogen compressor, flidised bed reactor
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences

The hydrogen supply line was at 160 bar and 500 °C.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROCESS
The hydrocracker was a prototype, aiming at refining crude oil rest. It was of the type 'ebullated bed reactor' , i.e. a type of fluidized bed reactor that utilizes ebullition, or bubbling, to achieve appropriate distribution of reactants and catalysts. Hydrogen and feedstock enter at the bottom of the reactor, thereby expanding the catalyst bed.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
4000000
Post-event summary
The facility suffered such major damage that it had to be rebuilt. According to another source, the 325 M$ of 2016 can be converted into 401M$ of 2021.

There is no record of the event having consequences for human health, the environment or non-company property. The data recorded by the air quality monitoring network did not reveal significant increases in the concentration of the pollutants measured.
Official legal action
Two managers were found guilty of contributing to the incident through negligent and imprudent conduct.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures
adopted concerned both redesigning parts of the facilities and implementing additional management measures to monitor critical equipment. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide details.

Event Nature

Release type
Gas-liquid mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
hydrocarbons
Released amount
70 t hydrocarbons
0.3 t hydrogen.
Actual pressure (MPa)
16
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Event description in the European database eMARS <br />
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/emars/accident/view/0b8a7a30-41d5-ba1… />
(accessed December 2023)

MARSH report, 100 largest losses in the hydrocarbon industry, 27th edition 2022<br />
https://www.marsh.com/cz/en/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-la… />
(accessed January 2024)

prima PAVIA News of 15 September <br />
https://primapavia.it/cronaca/incendio-raffineria-eni-due-dirigenti-con… />
(accessed January 2024)

JRC assessment