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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire in a chlorine electrolysis plant

Event

Event ID
917
Quality
Description


First an explosion and then a fire occurred on the condensate piping of an chlorine electrolysis plant (SEVESO upper tiers). Flames escape from the end of the pipe and spill into a 75 m³ open sky tank, containing the electrolysis products (water, HCL, NaOH, Na).

According to the ARIA report, (see References) a maintenance operation was ongoing on the HCl furnace located nearby. Investigations conducted by the operator identified a design defect as the cause of the incident. The overflow of the guard hydrogen hydraulic system was wrongly connected to the condensate piping.
Due to the fact that the HCl furnace was in maintenance, an excess of hydrogen under overpressure developed and escaped through the condensate piping. The presence of hydrogen at the outlet of this pipe, combined with a spark related to the work on the furnace, caused a detonation and then the fire.
This ATEX zone was not identified during work on the furnace because hydrogen was not expected to be present in the area.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
INITIATING cause was the ignition of the flammable hydrogen mixture present on the line of the condensate.
The root cause was a wrong design, which connected the hydrogen discharge pipe to the condensate pipe.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
condensate piping
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The electrolysis plant was normally function, maintenance works started nearby

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
The storage of epoxy is destroyed et three plastic pipelines are burned. The electrolysis unit is stopped for 24 ore.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

According to the ARIA report, to be able to restart the production, the operator implemented the following actions:

1. modifications to allow the independent discharge to the atmosphere of the surplus of hydrogen.
2. assessment of the electrical equipment of the area.
3. Verification of the installation modifications history
4. Review of the HAZOP (Hazard and Operation Procedures) of the circuits of hydrogen, chlorine and hydrochloric acid .
5. Control of the hydrogen detection system of the electrolytic unit

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Mechanical sparks
Flame type
Flash fire

References

Reference & weblink

Description of the event in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/52072/<br />
(accessed September 2020)

JRC assessment