Skip to main content
Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in the hydrogenation reactor of a chemicals manufacturing plant

Event

Event ID
916
Quality
Description
Explosion in a chemical manufacturing plant for the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries, classified as Seveso high level,

The explosion occurred in the hydrogenation reactor, when opening two buffer tanks to clean the reactor the after hydrogenation using a catalyst (ruthenium on coal).

Following the explosion, the operator initiated the emergency plan, evacuated personnel and secured the area. Two operators were injured.

According to the ARIA source, the explosion was probably be due to the presence of hydrogen in the reactor, because the nitrogen purging was not performed despite the procedures in place. The flammable mixture created by the entrance of oxygen at the opening of the buffers, was then ignited by a hot spot formed by a catalyst deposit which probably had become pyrophoric after activation.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
INITIATING cause of the explosion was the presence of hydrogen when opening to air the tank.

Intermediate cause was the failing to apply the procedure to purge the tank with nitrogen.

ROOT CAUSE is unknown, because it is not known why the procedure was no followed.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
pharmeceutical and cosmeticals manufacturer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
hydrogenation reactor, buffer tank
Location type
Confined
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The incident started when tanks for cleaning.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
2
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
Two operators in the vicinity of the reactor at the time of the explosion were injured.
The system was not damaged.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

An additional measure, not mentioned in the ARIA report, would come from answering the question on why the procedure was not followed, and what can be put in place to guarantee/monitor that they are followed in the future.
Corrective Measures

The operator introduced the following two improvements
1. Review and re-assessment of the operative procedures
2. new training of the workers.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Hot surface

References

Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/52794/<br />
(accessed September 2020)

JRC assessment