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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Hydrogen compressor explosion and fire at a refinery.

Event

Event ID
675
Quality
Description
An explosion and fire occurred at a reciprocating recycle hydrogen compressor during commissioning of a new Diesel hydrotreatement Unit. It happened during the reactor pre-sulphidisation step, when the recycle gas contained 9000 ppm of H2S (hydrogen sulphide) and the pressure was at 940 psig (65 bar).
The failure of retaining bolts on head-end suction valve unloader of recycle cylinder on compressor allowed release of process gas.
Investigations revealed that the bolts failed due to material inappropriate to prevent sulphide stress cracking) and inadequate design for the service. The manufacturer did not comply with the company's practice for reciprocating compressors in H2S applications.

The compressor was damaged.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause was the failure of valve bolts on the hydrogen compressor which recycles the H2S-containing hydrogen coming from the hydrotreater.
Contributing causes were an inadequate design, the choice of incorrect material and stress corrosion cracking

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
hydrotreatment
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
hydrogen recycling compressor, bolts
Location type
Confined
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
A Diesel Hydrotreater Unit removes impurities like sulphur and nitrogen from diesel, in the presence of a catalyst and hydrogen.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
100000
Post-event summary
Damage to equipment US $100 000 (1993).
Damage to compressor shelter, instrumentation. Estimated 250 man hours spent on investigation.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The ICHEME database (see reference) lists the following lesson learnt:
(1) Standards are essential to the safety of any process plant project. These standards apply to design control, purchasing, construction, and inspection and testing of purchased equipment.
(2) Each group involved in a project, whether contractors, suppliers, designers, procurement, manufacture, construction, etc. plays a key role in assuring the equipment's fitness for use.
(3) All possible process conditions must be detailed in the specification for the purchase of equipment.
(4) HAZOP studies must include all deviations from the design operating conditions such as shutdown, start-up, maintenance, and other activities such as the pre-sulphiding process to check the adequacy of the design.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
6.5
Hole shape
Gap
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Deflagration
Y
Flame type
Other

References

Reference & weblink

Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF<br />
<br />
https://www.icheme.org/media/7178/activity-operationalactivities-detail… />
(accessed November 2020)<br />

JRC assessment