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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

An explosion and a fire in the hydrogen compression building

Event

Event ID
653
Quality
Description
Hydrogen leaked from a hydrogen compressor, ignited causing an explosion and a fire. The hydrogen fire further ignited roofing materials which had fallen down as the result of the explosion.

The operator, who was outside the plant when the explosion occurred, pulled the emergency switch which shut down all the compressors. Although in a dazed condition, he then checked in the motor room that all the motors had stopped. He was subsequently taken to hospital where he was found to have no physical injuries but was moderately shocked. The fire alarm was raised by the gatekeeper who had heard the explosion and seen flames and smoke in the vicinity of the hydrogen plant. The works fire team were quickly on the scene but were advised not to extinguish the fire while hydrogen was still escaping, to prevent the likelihood of further explosion.

The supply of hydrogen to the compression plant was cut off and the plant was electrically isolated before the arrival of the County Brigade. By the time they arrived, (within about seven minutes), the flow of hydrogen had stopped and the fire was quickly extinguished using water.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Main component involved?
Joint/Connection (Gauge)
How was it involved?
Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (Generic)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE of the first explosion was attributed to the failure of the coupling of a pressure gauge, the associated pipe and the related isolating valve. This conclusion was based on the finding of this component on the floor near a wall.

The ROOT CAUSE is of difficult attribution. All similar couplings were found properly installed. A better risk assessment during intrinsic safe design could have recognised that failure of this type of coupling had worse consequences than other types of high pressure joints, and could have taken additional preventive measures.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Production
Sub-application
hydrogen compression
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
valve, compressor and motor
Location type
Confined
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The compressor involved had recently been overhauled and handed back to production on the day before the explosion. It ran satisfactorily for an hour before being shut down to fix clamps on the high pressure cooling coils which were vibrating.

It was restarted on the following morning and again ran without signs of trouble until the explosion occurred after nearly an hours running.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Post-event summary
The supply of hydrogen to the compression plant was cut off and the plant was electrically isolated before the arrival of the County Brigade. By the time they arrived, (within about seven minutes), the flow of hydrogen had stopped and the fire was quickly extinguished using water.

Apart from the shocked operator, there were no other personnel injured. Damage due to the explosion, much of it superficial had been caused to the roof and walls of the building, plant instrumentation. and electrical wiring. Windows were broken in adjacent building. The fire caused only minor damage in the vicinity of the affected compressor.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The post-incident investigation attributed the initial loss of confinement to the failure of the coupling between the compressor and a pressure gauge system consisting of the gauge itself, the connecting pipe and the isolating valve. All similar couplings were checked and found to be satisfactory. Nevertheless, it was noted that the failure of this type of joint has more serious consequences than failures of other types of high pressure joint.
The possibility of higher risks for critical joints should be recognised and taken into account during initial safe design.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

JRC assessment