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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion at oil storage tank in a refinery

Event

Event ID
612
Quality
Description
This incident occurred unit at a demonstration of a new technology for the catalytic cracking of vacuum residual oil. An oil storage tank failed due to high pressure. The overpressure in the tank was the result of a backflow of compressed hydrogen gas. When operators reduced the discharge pressure of the feedstock feed pump, high-pressure hydrogen gas in the reaction system flowed back into a feedstock surge drum and then into the cooling oil receiver. The pressure of the cooling oil receiver increased and the oil blew out and the feedstock surge drum ruptured and a fire occurred.
Detailed incident evolution:
The shutdown of the unit was performed to replace substituted with heavy gas oil piping in the morning.
13:00; a shift leader ordered two operators to stop the feedstock feed pump.
13:08; one of the operators checked the discharge pressure, which was 19 MPa, and directed the other operator to open the circulation line valve to the feedstock surge drum.
After they informed the control room, they started the operation of opening the valve on the circulation line.
13:15; as the discharge pressure fell to 1.65 MPa, they began to close the valve at the discharge side of the pump.
13:16; when the spindle stroke of the discharge valve was 50%, they found oil blowing out from the manhole of the cooling oil receiver.
13:17; they informed to the control room of the oil blowout. When they ran to the site to check what had happened, the feedstock surge drum burned out.
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Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause of the incident was backflow of compressed hydrogen gas to the oil storage tank, which ruptured due to overpressure. The backflow itself was either caused (i) because of the outlet valve on the pump was not completely closed or (ii) because a combination of a pressure decrease at the outlet of the pump and the non-return value failure as a result of excessive opening of the valve.
According to the analysis of the source, the root cause was a combination of:
(1) The procedure was wrong (the valve operations should have been inverted)
(2) the overall manual character of the operation increases the chance to mistakes,
(3) possibly lack of specific knowledge could be as well a contributing cause.

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
Generic refinery process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
oil storage tank, oil and hydrogen line, non-return valve
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The unit was shutdown, to allow for piping replacement.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
2
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
Only dmage to the oil tank

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Check valves sometimes do not work well when it is necessary.
An operation manual on actions to be taken assuming the check valve does not work is needed.
Basic knowledge on gas dynamics is required: for example, it should not be forgotten that fluid flows from high-pressure to low-pressure.
Corrective Measures
TECHNICAL
A restriction orifice shall be installed in the circulation line piping.
A check valve shall be replaced.
The back-flow monitoring system shall be changed.
The emergency shutdown valve should be reviewed.

Operation procedures have to be revised.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
19
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Originally in RISCAD, now in JST Failure Knowledge Database: <br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000135.html

Scheme from the JST Failure Knowledge Database: <br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000135.html

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): <br />
https://www.khk.or.jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_inc… />
(accessed May 2025)

JRC assessment