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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

runaway from a propylene hydrogenation reactor

Event

Event ID
553
Quality
Description
During the start-up of a propylene hydrogenation reactor, very high temperatures were generated in the catalyst bed. At the time, propylene and hydrogen were being fed to the reactor which contained a granular catalyst. The temperature rose rapidly, and the hydrogen supply valve tripped at 176 degrees C. Despite the removal of the reactant supply, the temperature continued to rise to more than 600 degrees C, only stabilizing after the reactor had been isolated and depressurized.

It was concluded that the start of the incident was caused by wrongly setting the propylene/ hydrogen ratio as a result of faulty calibration of the flow instruments. This allowed the temperature to rise to the point where spontaneous exothermic polymerization of propylene occurred.
Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
No Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The initial cause of this incident was over-hydrogenation, which in turn generated sufficiently high temperatures to begin polymerisation of propylene.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
unspecified
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
insulation of a cold box
Location type
Unknown
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The reactor was being started

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
No injury to personnel occurred as a result of this incident and there was no damage to the reactor shell

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The following recommendations were made:
1. Stops should be fitted to key controllers/valves to limit flows in the event of a malfunction.
2. Situations where hydrogenation reactors are isolated or have only low flows through them during commissioning, maintenance or other operations should be identified and avoided.
3. The integrity of the trip system should be improved.
4. Good maintenance procedures are required to avoid the possibility of incorrectly calibrated transmitters being returned to process.
5. All records should be retained for a period, and should and incident occur, all relevant records should be impounded immediately (this last recommendation comes from the fact that the Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts).

Event Nature

Release type
no release
Released amount
0
Presumed ignition source
No release

References

Reference & weblink

Evenr nr 9303 of he ICHEME database<br />
https://www.icheme.org/media/7141/causes-chemical-details.pdf<br />
(accessed Dec 2020)

JRC assessment