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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire atthe power generator of a power plant

Event

Event ID
495
Quality
Description
A nuclear power lant experienced a generator hydrogen fire.
The event started with a short circuit inside the main transformer, which damaged the hydrogen coolant system of the generator, followed by multiple hydrogen fires in the turbine hall.
The steam supply system of the reactor detected the failure of the transformer and was separated from the turbine-generator unit. The reactor was successfully shut down. There was no radiation emission.

The damage was limited to the plant's main transformer, electrical conductors and wires leading from the generator to the transformer.
The fire was extinguished by onsite personnel.
The outage lasted one month.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
How was it involved?
Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Conventional Component Failure (Electricity, Power)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITATING CAUSE was an electrical failure of the main transformer, responsible for the supply of the electrical power generated in the reactor to the electrical national grid.
The power plant operator stated that "... there is no way of guaranteeing that transformer will not fail". The ROOT CAUSE can then by identified as unspecified material failure.

Facility

Application
Power Plant
Sub-application
Nuclear power plant - PWR
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
Main generator
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
Damage was limited to the transformer itself and to a part of the hyrogen supply system.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The US.NRC issued a note to alert addressees to problems that could result from inadequate controls to ensure that shift staffing is sufficient to accomplish all necessary functions required by an event. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Corrective Measures
In this plant, the breaker was installed between the transformer and the offsite electrical grid. The transformer was placed outside the turbine-generator hall and is separated from it by a hall wall.
The operator investigated how to further minimise the effects of transformer failures.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

US NRC document ML20073N464<br />
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2007/ML20073N464.pdf<br />
(accessed January 2026)

US NRC document ML20083D289<br />
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2008/ML20083D289.pdf<br />
(accessed January 2026)

US.NRC Information Notice No. 91-77: Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants<br />
available at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/19…

JRC assessment