Event
- Event ID
- 400
- Quality
- Description
- A hydrogen compressor had been shut down for repairs and was being put back into service when the explosion occurred, causing damage . The compressor was equipped with interchangeable in take and outlet valves, which had been exchanged during re-installation.
[Ordin, NASA (1974)] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Main component involved?
- Compressor / Booster / Pump (Valve)
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Wrong Installation
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The discharge valve was installed in the intake position causing the cylinder head to blow off and release hydrogen to the atmosphere. Source of ignition unknown.
A CONTRIBUTION CAUSE could be related to a wrong execution of a maintenance/repair step. However, the fact that the two valves could be exchanged calls for a ROOT CAUSE on inadequate procedures and risk assessment.
Facility
- Application
- Non-Road Vehicles
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Compression (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- discharge valve,
H2 compressor - Location type
- Unknown
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- The event highlighted the importance of correct and unambiguous labelling of components, error-proof connections and accurate installation/repair instructions. The lack of these elements not only witness scarce attention to operative procedures, but it is also as well a sign of an inadequate risk assessment.
In fact, the workers involved should be well trained, also by making clear which would be the consequences of exchanging components or mounting them inverted.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Ignition delay
- N
References
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 60 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002
Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)Also uptaken in US database H2TOOLS<br />
https://h2tools.org/lessons/discharge-valve-installation-error<br />
(accessed Decembr 2025)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ORDIN
