Event
- Event ID
- 324
- Quality
- Description
- Approximately 250kg hydrogen gas released from vent stack following failure of a relief valve on bulk hydrogen installation.
No ignition and no injuries.
The system had been recently installed. It was equipped with a number of pressure relief controls. This controls were designed to be able to handle in various ways hydrogen overpressure situations. At first, the main regulator was opening at a cylinder pressure exceeding 8.6 bar; it was closing again at 9.7 bar. Above this pressure, a relief valve was opening at 10.5 bar releasing the hydrogen via a feed pipe to the process. If this operation was failing to relieve the pressure, a second relief valve was opening at 12.5 bar and the hydrogen was vented to the atmosphere via a stack. Finally, a pressure relief valve (PRV) activating at 16.5 bar represented the ultimate system protection.
In the case of this incident, the second relief valve opened but did not re-closed correctly, probably because of the freezing of the valve seat. This caused an uncontrolled release of hydrogen to the atmosphere. The situation was quickly recognised and steps were taken to stop the release.
During the release, a 5 mm pipe connecting the second relief valve to the vent snapped due to the shock caused by the hydrogen pressure wave. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- United Kingdom
- Date
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- INITIATING CAUSE
The uncontrolled hydrogen release to the atmosphere was caused by a relief valve failure to re-close, possibly due to freezing.
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE
The hydrogen released by this valve was supposed to be discharged to the environment via a vent duct. However, the connection between the valve and the vent failed.
ROOT CAUSE
The failure of the valve has been related to its possible freezing. This suggest an ill-design, related to the choice of a wrong component unable or to failing to consider all occurring environmental conditions during operation. Also the snapping of a pipe due to the shock wave of the release is due to ill-design.
[NOTE of HIAD Validator: the pressure control system is not well described by the sources, so that it is impossible to assess its design-soundness in term of safety.]
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Facility
- Application
- Electronics And Micro-Electronics
- Sub-application
- hydrogen storage
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- vent stack, pressure relief valve, pipe.
- Location type
- Unknown
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Property loss (onsite)
- 0
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- 250 kg of hydrogen released to the atmosphere, but they did not ignite.
No injury, no damage.
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
- S
High and high/high pressure alarms were installed between the operating pressures of the two relief valves.
The originally straight 5mm pipe were replaced by pig-tails to better absorb shock loadings.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Released amount
- 250
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 0.86
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 0.125
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
- Deflagration
- N
- High pressure explosion
- N
- High voltage explosion
- N
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description provided by HSE, original source confidential
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- HSE