Event
- Event ID
- 310
- Quality
- Description
- During the development test of a booster, a 3000 psig (ca. 205 bar) relief valve actuated at the normal line pressure releasing gaseous hydrogen, which ignited, resulting in an explosion which damaged the test facility.
[Ordin, NASA (1974)] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Main component involved?
- Prd (Valve)
- How was it involved?
- Premature Activation
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The IMMEDIATE CAUSE was the premature activation of the pressure relief valve.
This was due to the improper setting of the activation pressure.
The ROOT CAUSE was an inadequate inspection procedure, and a CONTRIBUTING CAUSE was a poor design of the venting system which was installed in a horizontal position causing inadequate venting and build-up of static electricity.
Facility
- Application
- Non-Road Vehicles
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- relief valve, booster
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- The site needed to implement an effective inspection procedure, by checking all relief valve set points.
As H2TOOLS puts it, a proper vent system design is as important as the relief valve itself. A venting system should be able to release hydrogen to the atmosphere at a safe location (the height above ground maybe even be prescribed by law) and done in a way to maximising the probability of hydrogen dispersion without ignition sources.
A horizontal venting stack plaid a role as contributing cause also in the event HIAD_302, belonging as well to the collection of NASA mishaps.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 20.5
- Design pressure (MPa)
- > 20.5
- Presumed ignition source
- Static electricity
References
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 6 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002
Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)Hankinson and Lowesmith, HAZIDs for Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation , FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.11 (2013)<br />
https://www.idealhy.eu/uploads/documents/IDEALHY_D3-10%20HAZIDs_Liquefa… />
(Only summary publicly available, accessed October 2025)References\HIAD_310 H2TOOLS.pdf
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ORDIN
