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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion on a storage vessel of a chemical plant

Event

Event ID
306
Quality
Description
The accident occurred when a welder of a sub-contractor company was working on a tank roof. The zeolite crystallisation tank was being cleaned out with approx. 20% sulphuric acid. It was not pressurised and was vented to atmosphere. The worker had been asked to cut a larger inspection hole in tank top. He had not yet begun to cut, but possibly had already lit up the oxy-acetylene equipment, when a loud explosion was heard by many.

Hydrogen evolution due to acid action on steel vessel walls was suspected to be the cause of the accident.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
United Kingdom
Date
Main component involved?
Chemical Storage Tank (H2so4)
How was it involved?
Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
Initiating cause
Accidental Hydrogen Formation
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The HSE communication does not give indications useful for drawing a root cause.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
Chemical storage
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
zeolite crystallisation tank, H2SO4, welding gear
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The accident occurred when the tank was being cleaned. An additional intervention was planned, consisting in cutting a large inspection hole on the tank top. .

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
1
Investigation comments
1. Oxy acetylene equipment and sample from tank taken for analysis.

2. FCG contacted.

3. Hydrogen evolution due to acid action on steel vessel walls
suspected to be the cause of the accident.
Emergency action
The fire was fought by means of water and cement. The smoke triggered a request of home-confinement to few neighbouring houses.
EMERGENCY ACTIONS SEQUENCE
9:30 The fire started.
At 9:34 - Fire department was called and the shut-off valves were closed. While awaiting the arrival of emergency services, site personnel sprayed the fire with a fire hose reel and a fire hose.
10:00 - The firefighters deployed two fire hoses, one of which was mounted on an aerial ladder. 10:45 - Cement, already on site due to ongoing construction work, was used to smother the fire. A new supply had to be requested from a local provider.
12:45 - The fire was brought under control around.
From 12:45 p.m. to 16:00 - The waste was removed from the building and then sprayed with foam to ensure complete extinguishment. Atmospheric readings were taken by emergency services, and the results showed no significant impact.
16:30 - The operation concluded. The firefighting water (approximately 5 m³) was contained on site. It was analysed to determine its discharge point. The waste removed from the building was secured, and the exterior surfaces were cleaned.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 (probably)
Presumed ignition source
Open flame
Deflagration
N
High pressure explosion
N
High voltage explosion
N

References

Reference & weblink

Event description provided by HSE, original source confidential

JRC assessment