Event
- Event ID
- 288
- Quality
- Description
- A tube trailer carrying compressed hydrogen was travelling along a city road, when the drivers heard an abnormal sound from behind. They stopped and discovered that hydrogen was leaking from the threaded joint of a pipe connecting all the tubes to the manifold. They tightened the joint, but the leak did not stop, therefore it was decided to transfer hydrogen to another tube trailer.
The reason of the leak was the O-ring of the joint, which did not fit properly. All tube trailers of the same type were modified by installing a valve to each of the tubes. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Asia
- Country
- Japan
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Joint/Connection (O-Ring)
- How was it involved?
- Leak & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Wrong Component
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was a defective O-ring causing a leak on a joint.
According to the KHK report, the was an inspection failure, which had not been able to identify the wrong O-ring and the ensure tightness the joint before departure. Since the leak was heard only when travelling, road vibration could have been a contributing factor. Since there was no possibility to isolate the tubes from the general manifold, the fundamental ROOT CAUSE is a shortcoming in design, which did not take into account all possible accidental scenarios.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- CGH2 tube trailer
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- O-ring, threaded joint
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- There were 22 long tubes on the trailer
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Post-event summary
- Since the O-ring was defective and therewas no possibility to isolate the tubes from the common manifold, it was decided to transfer hydrogen to another tube trailer.
- Emergency action
- Timeline of Accident:
• May 23, 9:30 AM: The station opened for business, with a monthly inspection scheduled.
• May 23, 10:35 AM: Filling of hydrogen into the FCV began.
• May 23, 10:37 AM: The gas detector in the dispenser detected a leak, and the equipment was shut down.
• May 23, 11:00 AM: The station was closed, and a hydrogen leak test was conducted, but no leak was detected.
• May 23, 19:20 PM: A filling test was conducted using the FCV, and a leak was detected from the emergency shutdown valve.
• May 24, 11:00 AM: The tightening torque of the emergency shutdown valve was checked, and it was found to be below the specified value.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): <br />
https://www.khk.or.jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_inc… />
(accessed May 2025)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- KHK