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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion at a chlorine electrolyser

Event

Event ID
177
Quality
Description
In a chlorine electrolysis facility, a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen in one of the electrolyser cells a short-circuit ignited causing a deflagration. The cover of the cell was a thin plastic film which broke as planned. The production was stopped.

According to the investigation, the inlet line of the electrolyte in the cell was blocked, which lead to an increase of the temperature in the cell and to the increase of oxygen production. On top of that, the alarm related to temperature control did not function.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Main component involved?
Electrolytic Cell
How was it involved?
Internal Explosion (H2-O2 Mixture)
Initiating cause
Malfunctioning (Electrolyser, Cross-Over)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause was a malfunction in the cell of a chlorine electrolyser.
Contributing cause was the malfunctioning of the alarm system related to the temperature monitoring of the process.

The root cause was probably an underestimation of this hazard in the safety design of the process. Nevertheless, a correct mitigating measure (weak enclosure to reduce the risk of a e deflagration) operated as designed and limited damage,

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
electrolyser cells
Location type
Confined
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
A short circuit ignite a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen in an electrolyser cell.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Emergency action
14:30 Leak detected from a pipe at 17 bar. The operator evacuates a hundred employees, stops production and puts the establishment in the safe mode. The emergency plan is initiated.
Water curtains are put into action and measurements of toxicity and explosimetry are carried out.
15:30 The pressure in the pipe at 0.5 bar. The measurements of toxicity and explosimetry in the ambient air being satisfactory,
15:45 Emergency plan is terminated
Public firefighters are on site but will not intervene.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

After the accident, the plant operator put in place a system of monitoring and control of the process performed by on-site teams.
This measure was completed later by the installation of an automatic alarm system. Finally, a study was performed to increase the reliability of the whole monitoring system of the installation.

Event Nature

Release type
gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2, O2
Presumed ignition source
Short circuit
Deflagration
Y
High pressure explosion
N
High voltage explosion
N

References

Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/25777/<br />
(access September 2020)

JRC assessment