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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion and fire on a piping of a desulphurisation unit

Event

Event ID
83
Quality
Description
At the time of the event, the desulphurisation unit was shut down for scheduled cleaning of a cooling tower with reintroduction of a gas mixture into the system at a high hydrogen content.
A 8″ heat-insulated carbon steel pipeline carrying a hydrocarbon/hydrogen mixture suddenly ruptured, releasing its content (it was located located along an upper rack). This triggered an explosion whose pressure surge was evaluated by the site operator at approx. 60 mbar at a distance of 10 m.
Since the leak was being fuelled, it followed a fire which affected other pipelines as well as the exhaust valves connected to the flare system. This explains the persistence of several secondary fire outbreaks, finally extinguished 8 hours later. The quantities released were estimated by the operator to be less than 2 tonnes of liquid hydrocarbons and 50 kg of hydrogen.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Main component involved?
Pipe
How was it involved?
Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Hc-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (External Corrosion)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was a leak on a pipe carrying hydrogen and hydrocarbons.

The rupture was due to external corrosion localised on the pipeline supporting structure. Over a section approx. 45 cm long on the line’s lower half-circumference, the residual pipe wall thickness was in average 3 mm thick, while the original average thickness was 6.5 mm. In some area the wall was think down to 1.2 mm. The rupture occurred in two stages: an initial break, followed by propagation of the opening because of the high pressure of gases circulating inside the pipeline.


A ROOT CAUSE is not provided by the source of this event. Nevertheless, from the corrective measures adopted, it can be deduced that the plant did not have effective inspection procedures able to detect degradation of the type occurred in the event. External corrosion is usually easy visible. However, it is very probable that the ruptured pipe was surrounded by thermal isolation layers. These not only hide any surface aggradation, but they may also as well contribute to the corrosion because of retainment of moistures.

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
pipe
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The desulphurisation unit was stopped for a programmed clean-up of an aero-cooling with circulation of a hydrogen-rich mixture.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
Euro
Property loss (onsite)
2500000
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
No victims were reported. The economic consequences were appraised at €500,000 of property damage and €2 million in production losses.
Official legal action
Local authorities asked for deep investigation on the accident causes and imposed conditions for restarting of the activity

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

The plant operator adopted the following measures, aiming at avoiding the reoccurrence of the event.

The risk assessment was reviewed, for the gas lines with corrosion hazard, either under the heat insulation or at the supporting points. In the new risk assessment, the possibility of a pipe burst has to be taken into account under specific operative conditions: service pressure above 25 bar; presence of gaseous or mixed fluids; diameter exceeding 2″; presence of hazardous fluid (H2, C2, C3, H2+H2S).

Moreover, the plant operator also ensured the adequate implementation procedures and good state of heat insulation. Finally, a special examination was also carried out on pipes not being stored on skids.

Event Nature

Release type
Gas mixture
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 50 kg
hydrocarbons 200 kg
Release duration
unknown
Released amount
50
Hole shape
unknown
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Deflagration
N
High pressure explosion
N
High voltage explosion
N

References

Reference & weblink

Event no.33071 of the French database ARIA <br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/33071/<br />
(accessed December 2020)

JRC assessment