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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Safety venting from a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
74
Quality
Description
A full liquid hydrogen tanker left the home terminal with a internal pressure of 6 psig. Throughout the trip, drivers experienced nothing other than normal conditions. 12 hours later, at a scale, the tank pressure reading was 11 psig. When the driver checked the unit again approximately one hour later, the pressure had climbed at 28 psig causing hydrogen to be vented.
They notified the home terminal and were advised to proceed to a nearby plant of the company to stabilize the pressure in the tank. They accomplished this and proceeded on to the delivery site with no further problems.
On subsequent trips, this tanker did not experience no abnormal pressure conditions. Therefore, the abnormal pressure rise could only be attributed to drivers' failure to properly stabilise the load before departing.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Lh2 Tanker
How was it involved?
Manual Venting
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Wrong Operation)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause of the hydrogen venting was an increase of the tank internal pressure.

The ROOT CAUSE was attributed to a shortcoming in following the stabilisation procedure of the liquid load before starting the journey.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
Vent
Location type
Open
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
320
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
PHMSA reports a loss of hydrogen comparable to the total quantity transported, not coherent with the narrative which speaks only of a stabilisation of the pressure. This could hint at an empty tank after delivery, but this journey started at the company plant for hydrogen production and liquefaction, so it is to be assumed that it was full load when it started the journey.
Emergency action
The level of risk has been rather elevated for rescue team. There was an explosion risks for cylinder involved in fire. Pressure inside cylinder was unknown and there wasn’t possibility to evaluate it remotely.

In fact, a jet fire was originated from a leak in one of the tube and a second tube was deformed. Fire brigades team has been water-cooled the tube to prevent an explosion and than turn off the jet-fire when it was reduced due to pressure reduction inside the tube.
Emergency evaluation
A thermo camera was used to evaluate the presence of hydrogen fires and the temperature and the shape of the tubes. This has allowed to identify the presence and nature of the hydrogen flame, and to follow the evolution of the flame.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
0.27
Design pressure (MPa)
0.14
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Event incident ID I-1992020529 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),<br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages<br />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment