Event
- Event ID
- 74
- Quality
- Description
- A full liquid hydrogen tanker left the home terminal with a internal pressure of 6 psig. Throughout the trip, drivers experienced nothing other than normal conditions. 12 hours later, at a scale, the tank pressure reading was 11 psig. When the driver checked the unit again approximately one hour later, the pressure had climbed at 28 psig causing hydrogen to be vented.
They notified the home terminal and were advised to proceed to a nearby plant of the company to stabilize the pressure in the tank. They accomplished this and proceeded on to the delivery site with no further problems.
On subsequent trips, this tanker did not experience no abnormal pressure conditions. Therefore, the abnormal pressure rise could only be attributed to drivers' failure to properly stabilise the load before departing. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Lh2 Tanker
- How was it involved?
- Manual Venting
- Initiating cause
- Over-Pressurisation (Wrong Operation)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING cause of the hydrogen venting was an increase of the tank internal pressure.
The ROOT CAUSE was attributed to a shortcoming in following the stabilisation procedure of the liquid load before starting the journey.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- LH2 tanker
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- Vent
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 320
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- PHMSA reports a loss of hydrogen comparable to the total quantity transported, not coherent with the narrative which speaks only of a stabilisation of the pressure. This could hint at an empty tank after delivery, but this journey started at the company plant for hydrogen production and liquefaction, so it is to be assumed that it was full load when it started the journey.
- Emergency action
- The level of risk has been rather elevated for rescue team. There was an explosion risks for cylinder involved in fire. Pressure inside cylinder was unknown and there wasn’t possibility to evaluate it remotely.
In fact, a jet fire was originated from a leak in one of the tube and a second tube was deformed. Fire brigades team has been water-cooled the tube to prevent an explosion and than turn off the jet-fire when it was reduced due to pressure reduction inside the tube. - Emergency evaluation
- A thermo camera was used to evaluate the presence of hydrogen fires and the temperature and the shape of the tubes. This has allowed to identify the presence and nature of the hydrogen flame, and to follow the evolution of the flame.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 0.27
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 0.14
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
Event incident ID I-1992020529 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),<br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages<br />
(accessed September 2024)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- PHMSA