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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Venting due to overpressure of a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
76
Quality
Description
A liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling back to the base terminal after having delivered at a customer site. Almost arrived to the end of the journey, the tanker started to vent. The drivers pulled over and checked pressure gauges, reading a 55 lbs value (probably 3.8 barg). The hydrogen vapour vented for about 1 minute and stopped when the pressure was at 38 lbs (probably 2.6 barg). The drivers proceeded to the base terminal. Once there, the inspection determined that the tanker had lost insulation capacity to vacuum deterioration.
The tanker was warmed up with warm gas and purged with inert nitrogen and sent to another company site for testing. There they found that the external shell of the tank was not able to maintain the required vacuum quality. The tanker was then transported to company headquarter for further diagnosis and repair before returning to service.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Prd (Valve)
How was it involved?
Correct Activation
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Thermal Insulation Degradation)
Root causes
Unknown (No additional details provided)
Root CAUSE analysis
INITIAL CAUSE was the deterioration of the vacuum between the inner vessel and outer vessel of the LH2 tank on the trailer, wit consequence loss of thermal isolation ability and over-pressurisation of the tank.

ROOT CAUSE: additional information of the reasons for the loss of vacuum is not provided.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
vacuum thermal insulation
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The tank was almost empty after delivery. The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) ,
The capacity is given in GCF, which probably does not refer to the max load (capacity) , but to the hydrogen gas left in the tank before venting. .

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
10
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
A loss of 1130 GCF is reportd, which probably corresponds to 2.9 kg
Emergency action
The fire brigade cooled the cylinders with by nebulized water. At the same time, they evacuated two persons that were working in the vicinity and closed the road to the traffic.
A thermal camera allowed to assess the temperature of the cylinders, therefore assisting the cooling of the hot spots.
The last operation was the emptying of the of the cylinders under jets of nebulized water.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This incident is very similar to other, such as the HIAD_070, which attributed to road vibrations the opening of the vapour return valve.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
0.48
Design pressure (MPa)
0.36
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Event incident ID I-1991090456 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),<br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages<br />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment