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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Small release from a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
376
Quality
Description
A liquid hydrogen tanker was parked at a parking place. The vacuum on the tanker vessel deteriorated causing inner container pressure increase. When the inner container pressure reached the nominal pressure limit, the safety relief valve automatically vented the trailer.
The vessel was allowed to vent, to allow to reduce the internal pressure to a value safe for transport back to home terminal. The tanker was taken out of service and vacuum problem repaired.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Prd (Valve)
How was it involved?
Correct Activation
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Thermal Insulation Degradation)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIAL CAUSE was the activation of the pressure relief valve due to increased internal pressure of the cryogenic vessel.
The ROOT CAUSE was the reduction of the thermal isolation capacity of the isolation external shell of the vessel, due to a deterioration of the vacuum.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
vent valve
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
384
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
25 kg of hydrogen were released

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The safety measures in place worked as expected. Releasing (‘’venting”) hydrogen to reduce internal pressure is a standard procedure when travelling. Usually, drivers are able to monitors vessel pressure by regular inspection and therefore perform a venting before the pressures reach the set value of the pressure relief valve. In this case, probably, the stop at the parking place had been too long to detect early enough the thermal isolation deterioration of the vessel, and avoid the valve activation.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
6.6994700984103
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Report I-1993050528 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment