Event
- Event ID
- 520
- Quality
- Description
- On 17 February 2000, THOR EMILIE was lost. The ship had been chartered by a Swiss company to carry about 2,000 tonnes of oxide zinc ore in bulk from Dunkerque in France to Porto Vesme on Sardinia. The cargo had been transported to Dunkerque on board four barges from the seller of the material, a company in France, and the loading took place directly from the barges to THOR EMILIE.
When the ship was about 85 nautical miles south of the island of Ibiza and about 60 nautical miles north of the coast of Algeria, a vehement explosion occurred. The ship sank very quickly. Six members of the crew were lost and only the master of the ship survived the loss.
After the loss, it became known that THOR EMILIE’s cargo did not consist of oxide zinc ore, but of zinc skimming, which is covered by the IMO’s Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (the Bulk Code) as a product which may generate hydrogen in connection with moisture or water. The material, which is a residual product from galvanisation processes, had been collected from various companies in the area over a period of about six months prior to the loss.
When the barges were loaded, the material was loaded from a depot in the open air next to the factory onto trucks by means of a grab and then tipped down into the barges. Later in Dunkerque, the material was transferred from the barges to the cargo hold of THOR EMILIE by means of a crane ashore and a grab. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- Denmark
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Ship
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-O2 Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Accidental Hydrogen Formation
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was an explosion caused by accidental production of hydrogen.
The ship cargo was known and declard as zink ore, but in fact it was cosnsiting of zinc skimming. it is nkown that zinc skimming generates hydrogen in connection with moisture or water, and therefore its transport is covered by specific provision in the IMO ' Bulk Code' .
Experts of the shipping company and of the shipper studied samples of the load materials. They concluded that the cargo generated hydrogen in reaction with water.
The ROOT CAUSE can be identified in lack of control of the cargo compositions, and probably a lack of knowledge of the related hazards and and the required preventive measures. Since the chemical phenomena causing the incident were well known and regulated by a IMO code , this absence of proper risk assessment should be assigned to a management failure, combined possibly with a failure of the procedures along the control chains for the cargo's.
Facility
- Application
- Other
- Sub-application
- Maritime goods transport
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- Ship cargo, zinc skimmings
- Location type
- Confined
- Location description
- Other
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- When the barges were loaded, the material was loaded from a depot in the open air next to the factory onto trucks by means of a grab and then tipped down into the barges. Later in Dunkerque, the material was transferred from the barges to the ship cargo by means of a crane ashore and a grab.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 1
- Number of fatalities
- 6
- Post-event summary
- ix members of the crew were lost and only the master of the ship survived the loss.
Loss of ship.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- According to a news site ing.dk (see references), the investigation report of the Danish Maritime Authority, among other things, criticised the shipping company for not having sufficiently and adequately documented that the cargo was dangerous and could explode during transport.
The report recommended the shipping company to improve all their information about the cargo before a transport is agreed.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas-solid mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2,
H2O,
ZnO ore - Actual pressure (MPa)
- n.a.
- Design pressure (MPa)
- n.a.
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
References
- Reference & weblink
vragwiki site<br />
https://vragwiki.dk/wiki/Thor_Emilie_2000_Vestlige_Middelhav<br />
(accessed Feb 2023)Google trnslation from the news site ingenioer, <br />
https://ing.dk/artikel/skibsforlis-kunne-vaere-undgaaet<br />
9accessed october 2025)Original source: Danish Maritime Authority, News archive, May 2003 news,<br />
http://soefart.inforce.dk/sw2152.asp,
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- News