Event
- Event ID
- 840
- Quality
- Description
- A sudden failure occured on a hydrogen line of a refinery desulphurisation unit. The equipment was located between a hydrogen compressor and its overpressure protection valve. It was equipped with an automatical isolation system, however, the failed pipe, located at the bottom of the system, was without self-draining mechanism. .
The bursting of the pipe was due to its corrosion: a large loss of thickness extended over 300 mm. The presence of a bend at a low point on a line without circulation led to the accumulation of deposits initiating a corrosion mechanism. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- No Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Pipe
- How was it involved?
- Rupture
- Initiating cause
- Material Degradation (Internal Corrosion / Erosion)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- INITIATING CAUSE was corrosion which reduced the stress-bearing wall thickness of the pipe.
The ROOT CAUSE was found in a non-optimal design, failing to identify and taking care of weak points on the line.
Facility
- Application
- Petrochemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Hydrodesulphurisation process
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- hydrogen line of a refinery desulphurization unit
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The valve inlet lines were similar to dead arms and should have been considered as such when establishing inspection plans. They must be the subject of the corresponding enhanced controls;
2. The lines should be as short as possible and self-draining.- Corrective Measures
The operator modified the layout of the piping to avoid low points. It performed thickness checks on lines identified as sensitive.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- No release
References
- Reference & weblink
ARIA data base <br />
event no. 51671
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA