Event
- Event ID
- 567
- Quality
- Description
- A release of contents of a pressure vessel occurred when a longitudinal weld tore open. The vessel had been shut down and had just been put into use again when the incident occurred.
The gas mixture contained hydrocarbons with 30% hydrogen. It had reached its working pressure of 31 bar, but was only at -26 degrees C, instead of the working temperature of -73 degrees C, no liquid was present.
An investigation found a crack, 1.6 metres long, had formed near the upper end of the weld. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- Germany
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Gas Storage Tank (Weld)
- How was it involved?
- Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Hc-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Material Degradation (Generic)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The recommendations issued after the incident, suggest that the ROOT CAUSE could be a lack of proper inspection, and/or inspection performed with inadequate tools
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- unspecified
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- weld, vessel
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- The vessel had been shut down and had just been put into use again when the incident occurred.
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
- PROBABLE PROCESS
Although not specified by the source, the event occurred very probably at a vessel used to distillation and gas separation processes of the refinery, for example in what is commonly called a ‘cold box’. This assumption is based on temperature data provided. Propane, for example, liquifies at -42 C, it is therefore still gaseous at 31 C (the temperature at which the release occurred) and liquid at -73C, corresponding to the liquid nitrogen temperature, which probably was used as coolant vector,
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- Inspection procedures had not been developed for many operations, including measuring temperature from outside field panels underneath the reactors. This hints at a poor process hazard assessement, that did not even reflect the actual equipment degradation and instrumentation used in the process.
The following recommendations were made:
1. All vessels of similar construction to be tested for incipient cracks on the inner surface by using a dye penetration test.
2. If the interior is inaccessible, welds and impact zones are to be tested by ultrasonic methods.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- hydrocarbons 70%
H2 30% - Actual pressure (MPa)
- 3.1
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 3.1
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
Event nr 12735 of the UK database ICHEME in PDF format.<br />
https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/… />
(accessed October 2020)<br />Primary source in Chemical Hazards in Industry, No. 1 January 1998.<br />
(unavailable)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ICHEME