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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Release during CGH2 transfer

Event

Event ID
210
Quality
Description
A CGH2 tube trailer was parked at the delivery site and was transferring gaseous hydrogen to a stationary storage system. The transfer hose failed releasing hydrogen, which ignited. The resulting fire melted the valves and rupture discs on all tubes. The emergency action plan was initiated, an immediate evacuation of the area was executed and local fire department notified. The fire was extinguished and evacuation over after several hours.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Hose (Trailer)
How was it involved?
Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (Generic)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the rupture of the flexible hose.

The fire escalated from the hose to the trailer tubes. Their pressure relief system (burst disk) activated as expected in these cases, avoiding further escalation due to over-pressurisation of the tubes. However, the damage of additional valves on the trailer suggests a ROOT CAUSE in a shortcoming of a safety design of the transfer process, which did not consider this possibility and failed to guarantee fire protection to critical components.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transfer (No additional details provided)
All components affected
flexible hose, valves, TPRD, tubes.
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
The only data known on the trailer is that it consisted of 34 tubes. Using similar cases as a proxy, tubes nominal pressure was very probably 180 bar, and trailer nominal transport capacity was approximately 250 - 300 kg of hydrogen. If the incident occurred at the start of the transfer, the whole content was lost, vented through the burst disk and the vent stack.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
70259
Property loss (offsite)
0
Emergency action
The emergency services were and fire engines from two stations attended. The facility and the neighbourhood, including local schools and businesses were evacuated as a precautionary measure.
Although the sources do no report the tactics adopted by the fire-fighting teams, a news picture shows a water jet directed to the place of the fire.
The hazardous material incident team personnel closed the vent valve and the 2.5 hours later.

The tanker was inspected by the emergency response teams, declared safe and released to the owner which transported it back to its premises.
After that, it was inspected by a 3rd party vendor.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Incident I-1989110463 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment