Event
- Event ID
- 210
- Quality
- Description
- A CGH2 tube trailer was parked at the delivery site and was transferring gaseous hydrogen to a stationary storage system. The transfer hose failed releasing hydrogen, which ignited. The resulting fire melted the valves and rupture discs on all tubes. The emergency action plan was initiated, an immediate evacuation of the area was executed and local fire department notified. The fire was extinguished and evacuation over after several hours.
- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Hose (Trailer)
- How was it involved?
- Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Material Degradation (Generic)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was the rupture of the flexible hose.
The fire escalated from the hose to the trailer tubes. Their pressure relief system (burst disk) activated as expected in these cases, avoiding further escalation due to over-pressurisation of the tubes. However, the damage of additional valves on the trailer suggests a ROOT CAUSE in a shortcoming of a safety design of the transfer process, which did not consider this possibility and failed to guarantee fire protection to critical components.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- CGH2 tube trailer
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transfer (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- flexible hose, valves, TPRD, tubes.
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
- The only data known on the trailer is that it consisted of 34 tubes. Using similar cases as a proxy, tubes nominal pressure was very probably 180 bar, and trailer nominal transport capacity was approximately 250 - 300 kg of hydrogen. If the incident occurred at the start of the transfer, the whole content was lost, vented through the burst disk and the vent stack.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 70259
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Emergency action
- The emergency services were and fire engines from two stations attended. The facility and the neighbourhood, including local schools and businesses were evacuated as a precautionary measure.
Although the sources do no report the tactics adopted by the fire-fighting teams, a news picture shows a water jet directed to the place of the fire.
The hazardous material incident team personnel closed the vent valve and the 2.5 hours later.
The tanker was inspected by the emergency response teams, declared safe and released to the owner which transported it back to its premises.
After that, it was inspected by a 3rd party vendor.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
References
- Reference & weblink
Incident I-1989110463 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- PHMSA