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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Release in chlorate production plant

Event

Event ID
352
Quality
Description
In a plant manufacturing chlorate products, a hydrogen leak occurred via the water drainage outlet onto the factory floor. Pressure in the hydrogen line increased because the hydrogen pipes were filled with water. The situation was rectified by shutting down the process, draining the pipes and by redirecting the hydrogen flow.

Water entered into the hydrogen pipes because the selection switch on the hydrogen compressor had been turned to the 'fresh water' position, and as consequence more water was incorrectly fed into the process. As the intention was to run the compressor in the standard mode, water did not, within the time available, exit the system along the open route; instead, it rose to the hydrogen pipes.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Finland
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
INITATING CAUSE: a wrong manual operation
ROOT CAUSE: may be deemed to be the insufficient level of automation because a selection permitting human error had been left in the process.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
Chlorine production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
hydrogen supply line
Location type
Confined
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Property loss (onsite)
0
Property loss (offsite)
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The root cause was an insufficient level of automation, which allowed human error. Risk assessment shall consider this scenario and safety design should provide effective preventing measures.

Corrective Measures

The switch, which had been manually turned into an incorrect position, was removed.
Another upper limit was set that locked the valve controlling the separator level and ensuring that the compressor is stopped.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Deflagration
N
High pressure explosion
N
High voltage explosion
N

References

Reference & weblink

Source lost

JRC assessment