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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Release from a CGH2 trailer

Event

Event ID
384
Quality
Description
A pressure relief device (frangible burst disc) on one of a 26 tubes on a tube trailers failed prematurely and released hydrogen while filling a hydrogen storage tank at a government facility.
The first responders shut off the supply of hydrogen gas from the tube trailer to the common supply manifold by closing the isolation valve on each of the 26 tubes.

The probable pressure value at the moment of the disc opening was 2100 psi (145 bar), while the over-pressure-protection burst disks on each of the tube trailer's 26 tubes had a rated burst pressure of 4000 psi (275 bar).

[Source: H2TOOLS]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Prd (Burst Disc)
How was it involved?
Premature Activation
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the premature opening of e burst disc.

The probable ROOT CAUSE of this event was that the burst disc was degraded by the synergic events of exposure to hydrogen and stress associated with the working pressure involved. A contributing factor in this incident was the burst disc Inconel #600 material that has a high hardness/tensile strength, making it more susceptible to stress corrosion cracking (SCC). It should also be noted that the leak detection step prior to starting the hydrogen fill process is useful for finding leaks in threaded connections, but it could not have detected or predicted the premature failure of the burst disc.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
burst disc
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
Post-event analysis of the incident included removal of the tube trailer's affected over-pressure-protection frangible disc. Inspection of the disc determined that it had ruptured and the disc opening was separated from the rupture disc holder. No visible indication or presence of corrosion or contamination was found. Subsequent testing of other pressure relief devices also showed disc rupture at lower-than-expected pressures.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
No ignition
Deflagration
N
High pressure explosion
N
High voltage explosion
N
Flame type
Jet flame

References

Reference & weblink

JRC assessment