Event
- Event ID
- 425
- Quality
- Description
- A liquid hydrogen tanker was returning to the base after having deliver data customer site. The tank was empty. Nevertheless, on the road the drivers noticed a continuing elevated pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vents open while traveling, they decided to pull off the road and perform a controlled, manual venting .
Not having a customer "safe haven" within the immediate area, and after having seen an pressure increase from 47 to 51 psi within 10 minutes, they decided to make a controlled venting alongside an isolated section of the highway.
The drivers followed their standard venting safety protocol, and after approximately 3 minutes of venting, the tanker pressure had dropped to an acceptable 13 psi. After having waited for approximately 60 minutes, noting no significant pressure increases, they restarted the travel.
3 hours later, they had to perform again the same procedure, reducing the pressure from 26 psi to 13 psi. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Lh2 Tanker
- How was it involved?
- Manual Venting
- Initiating cause
- Unknown
- Root causes
- Unknown (No additional details provided)
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIAL was an increase of the pressure inside the LH2 trailer.
The ROOT CAUSE was probably a reduction of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell, but the PHMSA does not explicity state so.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- LH2 tanker
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- over-pressure
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- The LH2 tanker had a capacity of 3890 kg, but it was almost empty, containing only gaseous hydrogen
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 43
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- Only 2.5 kg went lost during the manual ' stabilisation' venting.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The safe systems and procedures worked as expected. The increase in pressure was probably due to a decrease of the thermal isolation capacity of the tank external shell.
For these cases, in this type of LH2 trailer-tractor the drivers could continuously monitor the pressure from inside the cabin, and notified the head quarter, receiving instructions. They were trained in performing a procedure called in jargon a ‘ stabilisation’ of the tank pressure, consisting in a manual venting aiming at reducing the pressure well below the nominal value.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Released amount
- 2.5
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 0.35
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 0.42
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
Incidents I-1999110008 and I-1999110007 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- PHMSA