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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over pressurisation of a LH2 trailer

Event

Event ID
1117
Quality
Description
A LH2 trailer was traveling to delivery hydrogen to a customer, while the drivers noticed an increase in trailer pressure. To avoid the possibility of having the safety vent open while on the road, they pulled into a truck stop. There they performed a controlled, manual venting of the trailer in a remote section of the truck stop. Drivers then continued on to destination without further incident.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Lh2 Tanker
How was it involved?
Manual Venting
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Wrong Operation)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIAL CAUSE was over-pressurisation of the LH2 tank, which caused an intervention of the drivers to reduce pressure.
BY using as proxy several similar events, ROOT CAUSE could be tentatively attributed to the failure to 'stabilise' the pressure of the tanker after delivery and before leaving customer's site. This is a procedure aiming at avoiding over-pressurisation by cold gaseous hydrogen during the return travel.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
unknown
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The trailer was full loaded, on the road towards a customer

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
122
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
A negligible amount of hydrogen was released.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

From this and several other cases reported in PHMSA database, it appears that a corrective measure often adopted in case of a slight increase of LH2 internal tank pressure is to perform a manual, controlled release of the hydrogen vapour to reduce pressure. Although not stated in the reports, the value of the pressure at which the drivers take action is less than the pressure value at which the automatic safety pressure control system activate.

Often the cause of the pressure increase is not stated, in other cases it is assumed having been a partial loss of the thermal insulation capacity (loss of vacuum in eh annular space between the internal and external shells of the cryogenic tank.

Anyhow, the corrective measure appears to be successful to continue the delivery to the customer or to return to the base with an empty tanks, despite the fact that the cause of the pressure increase is not eliminated, and it is expected that it will occur again.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
5.3633610900833
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Incident I-2002090431 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment