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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

Event

Event ID
377
Quality
Description
A liquid hydrogen tanker was travelling from the home terminal to delivery to a customer. After approximately 7 hours and 400 miles, the drivers noticed hydrogen venting from the vent stack. They immediately stopped the vehicle and discovered that the inner vessel pressure had risen to 54 psig. After consultation with supervisory personnel at the base terminal, the trailer was directed to a nearby customer and stabilised the pressure to 6 psig, by venting some gaseous hydrogen.
The tanker continued to the customer site without incident (additional 4 hours and 190 miles).
A post-accidental inspection revealed that the tanker had been overloaded during filling. At time of loading, it was covered with ice and snow. The calculations to compensate for this extra weight were not accurate which caused overloading of product.
All drivers have been re-instructed not to leave the terminals if the trailer weight exceeds the maximum loaded weight.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Lh2 Tanker
How was it involved?
Manual Venting
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Over-Filling)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIAL CAUSE of the release was the overfilling or overloading of the tank when preparing it for transportation.
A CONTIRBUTING CAUSE was the very low ambient temperature when the filling was executed.
The ROOT CAUSE was that the method used to calculate the amount of hydrogen transferred, taking into account the external temperature, were not accurate enough. Also, the procedure was not foreseen a second control, by controlling the weight of the load.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
LH2 tank overpressure
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The tanker was empty, having just delivered hydrogen to a customer site. Only gaseous hydrogen, no LH2 was left.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
202
Property loss (offsite)
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

This is a case of overloading of the liquid hydrogen tank due to extreme temperatures, which make difficult the calculation of the quantity transferred. The whole hydrogen delivery process has nevertheless additional safe guards:
(1) The weighting of the load before leaving the home terminal allows for a second independent control of the loaded quantity. In this case, however, this step had not been executed.
(2) On the road, regular checks of allows for the monitoring of the evolution of the internal vessel pressure and the early detection of an overpressure situation.
(3) Pressure relief system (often redundant) allows for an automatic control that the pressure does not exceed the maximum allowed value.

Corrective Measures

All drivers have been re-instructed not to leave the terminals if the trailer weight exceeded the maximum loaded weight.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
718.45117335352
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Report I-1993040222 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment