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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Near miss due to inadequate purge procedure

Event

Event ID
391
Quality
Description
During a welding operation on a LH2 fill line it was discovered that LH2 was still in the tank although it should have been drained. Hence the potential for a major explosion existed.

[Ordin, NASA (1974)]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
No Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Main component involved?
Pipe
How was it involved?
Risk Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Inadequate Or No Purge
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
A deviation from procedures had occurred when purging was continued without power to the tank sensing probes in the LH2 tank at the after 400th cycle. Because of the undetected presence of LH2 in the tank, when gaseous nitrogen was introduced, it liquefied and blocked the system.

Facility

Application
Non-Road Vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Storage (No additional details provided)
All components affected
LH2 pipe
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0

Event Nature

Release type
no release
Released amount
0
Actual pressure (MPa)
0.1
Design pressure (MPa)
0.1
Presumed ignition source
No release
Ignition delay
N

References

Reference & weblink

Mishap no 50 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)

JRC assessment