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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Manual venting from a LH2 tanker in transit

Event

Event ID
282
Quality
Description
While returning to the base, a liquid hydrogen tanker had to be vented twice.
The cause of the overpressure was a malfunctioning scale which allowed a slight overload of hydrogen.

[Zalosh and Short, 1978]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Lh2 Tanker
How was it involved?
Manual Venting
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Wrong Operation)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the build-up of pressure inside the tank, which forced to manual venting.
ROOT CAUSE was The cause of the overpressure was a malfunctioning scale which allowed a slight overload of hydrogen.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
manual vent
Location type
Open
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
0
Property loss (offsite)
0
Emergency action
The fire probably extingished by itself, the report does not mention any action aiming to reduce consequence, only that an ambulance was called.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Zalosh et al (see references), concluded their analysis of hydrogen transportation accidents till 1978 with the following conclusions:
"Finally, an encouraging aspect of the transportation incident compilation is that 71% of the hydrogen releases did not lead to an ignition. ... The relatively few ignitions may be due to either to lack of ignition sources or to the rapid dispersal of hydrogen into the atmosphere. In any event, the accident data provide further incentive t o transport , transfer and store hydrogen outdoors away from occupied areas."

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Appendix A of Zalosh and Short<br />
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENTS<br />
Quarterly Report No. 1 for Period September 1, 1977 - Novemebr, 1977<br />
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6566131<br />
(accessed September 2020)

Event incident I-19760200015 provided as example by Zalosh and Short Quarterly report 1 1977-78

Event incident I-19760200015 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),<br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages<br />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment