Event
- Event ID
- 203
- Quality
- Description
- The pressure building valve opened due to vibration from the road, causing the build-up of the internal pressure. The drivers performed a hydrogen venting and re-sealed the valve.
[Zalosh and Short, 1978] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Valve (Pressure Building)
- How was it involved?
- Leak & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Over-Pressurisation (Road Vibrations)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was the loosening of a valve due to vibration while travelling.
The ROOT CAUSE could be attributed to a shortcoming in the design of the connections or to the failing to tighten correctly the valve.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
- Sub-application
- LH2 tanker
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- pressure building valve
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 0
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Emergency action
- Since the leak could not be stopped locally, The fire brigade decided to drain the whole content of the pallet (246 m3) by gradually opening the valves and by keeping the rack cool.
The rack of the bottles was empty after four hours and the rescue operation ends at noon after the cylinder rack has been checked by an expert from the gas supply company. The residents returned to their homes and the plant's activity restarted one hour later. - Emergency evaluation
- A specialized expert emergency support cell estimated the leakage rate at 0.48 kg/s. They also estimated the distance to the Low flammability limit (LFL) about 30 m and the effects of an explosion in the event of delayed ignition of the cloud in the open air at 50 and 20 mbar over-pressure, for respectively 80 and 130 m.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
Zalosh et al (see references), concluded their analysis of hydrogen transportation accidents till 1978 with the following conclusions:
"Finally, an encouraging aspect of the transportation incident compilation is that 71% of the hydrogen releases did not lead to an ignition. ... The relatively few ignitions may be due to either to lack of ignition sources or to the rapid dispersal of hydrogen into the atmosphere. In any event, the accident data provide further incentive t o transport , transfer and store hydrogen outdoors away from occupied areas."
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
Extract from Table III of Appendix A of Zalosh and Short<br />
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENTS<br />
Quarterly Report No. 2 for Period December 1, 1977 - February 28, 1978<br />
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6566131<br />
(accessed September 2020)Event incident I-1975010476 of the PHMSA database (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 1996),<br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages<br />
(accessed September 2024)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- Zalosh