Event
- Event ID
- 1064
- Quality
- Description
- This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station.
Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off.
An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm.
The leak was located on the compressor’s filter. This filter was located in a restricted and confined space controlled by a gas detector. The detector triggered the alarm because the concentration of hydrogen in the atmosphere had reached its safety limit (25% of the lower explosive limit). Nevertheless the amount of dispersed hydrogen have been very low. The defective filter was replaced. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Unignited Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Compressor / Booster / Pump
- How was it involved?
- Leak
- Initiating cause
- Unknown
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The initiating cause of the event was a loss of confinement of a gasket inside the filter of the hydrogen compressor.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Refuelling Station
- Sub-application
- HRS
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Compression (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- Compressors, filter, gasket
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Airport Or Airborne
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- Approximately one month before, another hydrogen leak had affected the same HRS (See HIAD 1063)
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Property loss (onsite)
- 0
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- The supplier was officially contacted to identify the causes of this loss of tightness. The station was put not back in service till the supplier replied.
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
Following the event, the airport operator asked the hydrogen station operator:
• to inform local companies of risk management at hydrogen production facilities;
• to adjust the on-site intervention of technicians according to the need of the local companies.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- No ignition
References
- Reference & weblink
ARIA event<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/59921/
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA