Event
- Event ID
- 1050
- Quality
- Description
- The release affected a cryogenic vessel used for liquid hydrogen storage at a manufacturing facility. The A burst disc opened releasing hydrogen through a vent stack located between approximately at 5-6 m above ground.
The cryogenic hydrogen storage tank had an insulation jacket, but it had been idle for a long time. Therefore, the heat transfer through the tank insulation had caused the evaporation of liquid hydrogen enough to increase the pressure beyond the design pressure of the burst disc.
After the opening of the burst disc, the hydrogen was released to the environment through the stack without further consequences. It did not ignite.
Approximately seven months after the replacement of the burst disc, the new burst disc prematurely ruptured for the same reason. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- No Hydrogen Release
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Prd (Burst Disc)
- How was it involved?
- Correct Activation
- Initiating cause
- Over-Pressurisation (Excessive Boil-Off)
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was a natural increase of the internal pressure of the cryogenic tank.
The burst disc and the venting system operated safely and as expected .
The fact that the tank was left idling without inspection suggests that operator thought that the vacuum jacket eliminated the heat transfer, while in reality, it only reduced it.
The ROOT CAUSE is probably related to lack of maintenance and/or of knowledge of the operation of a cryogenic tank.
Facility
- Application
- Hydrogen Stationary Storage
- Sub-application
- LH2 stationary tank
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Hydrogen Storage (No additional details provided)
- All components affected
- burst disc
- Location type
- Open
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- The ambient temperature was approximately 16 °C (60 °F), the cryogenic hydrogen was approximately at −250 °C (−418 °F)
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Property loss (onsite)
- 0
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- No injuries or damage. The hydrogen safety venting equipment functioned properly.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
A cryogenic vessel will always produce some boil-off gas even with the insulation jacket. This requires frequent inspection and, potentially, manual venting. Moreover, a pressure relief device able to release the excess this boil-off gas and to maintain the internal pressure below the design value should be always present.- Corrective Measures
- (specific)
After a second burst disc opened seven month later, the cryogenic storage was equipped with some modifications with a system (not further specified) which eliminated the building of pressure on the burst disc.
(general)
(1) Liquid hydrogen installations should be inspected by facility personnel on a regular basis and according to existing regulations, standards and guidelines.
(2) Also the manufacturing of liquid hydrogen storage systems should follow the related requirements from existing technical regulations and standards.
(3) Hydrogen safety training should be provided to local emergency responders.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- > 1.03
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 1
- Presumed ignition source
- No release
References
- Reference & weblink
Report at H2TOOLS<br />
https://h2tools.org/lessons/unexpected-failure-rupture-disk-liquid-hydr… />
(accessed August 2024)A. Jimenez, C. Groth,<br />
Hazards associated with pressure relief devices in hydrogen systems, <br />
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries<br />
91 (2024), 105380, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2024.105380
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- H2TOOLS