Event
- Event ID
- 919
- Quality
- Description
The fire broke out in the acid etching tank of the ferric chloride manufacturing unit of a SEVESO-classified chemical plant. In this tank, the attack reaction of the iron metal with hydrochloric acid in solution is carried out, which results in ferrous chloride and hydrogen. The hydrogen generated is swept away by a large supply air fan to maintain the gaseous sky of the tank below the LFL.
A few days after the accident, the operator opened and analysed the tank to determine the origin of the fire.
According to the ARIA report, the start of the fire was caused by a slow combustion of hydrogen, initiated during the loading of metal. Despite the air circulation, hydrogen accumulated at the bottom of the tank due to its overfilling. The fire then spread outside the tank through the roof opening caused by the degradation of the hydrogen detector and by melting the blast doors. The fire was then alimented by the plastic components of the equipment and the surrounding piping, as well as by the oil from the hydraulic pistons of the roof door of the tank.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING cause was the overloading of the tank, which allowed accumulation of hydrogen despite the air circulation system.
Considering the corrective actions described in the ARIA report, the root cause was probably inadequate safety design and operation.
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Inorganic chemicals products
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- reaction tank, production of iron chloride (FeCl2)
- Location type
- Semiconfined
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
- DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
The stoichiometric reaction at the basis of the process is: Fe + 2 HCl → FeCl2 + H2
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Post-event summary
- No injuries. The unit restarted 6 months after the accident.
Damage to the tank upper parts, hydrogen detector and doors
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The accident suggests that the operative procedure related to the loading of the materials and the preventive measures (hydrogen detection) were inadequate.- Corrective Measures
According to the ARIA report (see references), the operator updates the risk analysis of this unit and reinforces controls on the level of scrap metal in the tank and analyses of hydrochloric acid.
It also added safety features on the low air sweep rate and high temperature in the tank and lowers the alarm threshold of the hydrogen analyser.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Flame type
- Other
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/49915/<br />
(accessed September 2020)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA