Event
- Event ID
- 925
- Quality
- Description
- The event occurred in a classified-Seveso metallurgical plant. A fire initiated in a acid treatment reactor of a workshop handling cementation of indium .
Under normal conditions, the reaction of the process in the tank releases hydrogen.
The fire propagated to the plastic components above the tank, causing black smoke released inside the workshop.
The origin of the fire were sparks produced by the grinding of metal gratings overhanging the tank. According to the ARIA report (see references), they must have come into contact with the gaseous atmosphere of the tank through the throughput of the stirring shaft.
The grinding work had been allowed by an intervention permit and was equipped with protections designed to limit the dispersion of sparks. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Reactor / Oven / Furnace / Test Chamber
- How was it involved?
- Fire
- Initiating cause
- Inadequate Or Wrong Design
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- INITIATING CAUSE were the sparks generated by grinding, supposed to enter the tank containing hydrogen as reaction product.
The ROOT CAUSE is not reported. Nevertheless, considering that the grinding works were designed to preventing hydrogen ignition, the root cause could be attributed to shortcoming i ndesin of the reactor and of risk-prrventing measures.
Facility
- Application
- Steel And Metals Industry
- Sub-application
- Indium production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- acid metallurgical treatment reactor
- Location type
- Confined
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- Maintenance works were executed on top of the reactor tank
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Official legal action
- The inspection of Seveso-classified installations required a detailed inspection of the tank in question and the systematic implementation of thermal camera control of hot spots following a fire
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
The fact that the inspection required for the future the systematic implementation of thermal camera during firefighting is due to the fact that during the emergency actions, the fire regained strength due to undetected hot spots.
The ARIA report (see references) does not report any lesson learnt. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably assumed that the event would profit from improved maintenance procedure, such as purging of the tank and monitoring hydrogen concentrations in the gaseous phase of tank.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- Mechanical sparks
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/46155/<br />
(accessed September 2020)<br />
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA