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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire from a LH2 trailer

Event

Event ID
1126
Quality
Description
An empty LH2 trailer was travelling back to the base to load new LH2, when one of the truck tyre (the inner tire on the driver’s side rear axle) blew causing sparks and smoke. The driver pulled over to the side of the highway and tried to extinguish the starting fire by a fire extinguisher. Since was not able to extinguish completely the fire, he reported the incident to the emergency number.

Due to the heat of he fire, the pressure rose inside the LH2 tank and the Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) activated releasing hydrogen gas into the atmosphere through the vent stack. The vented hydrogen ignited, developing fire at the vent stack. The first responders were able to extinguish the fire by using a helium fire abatement system. Meanwhile the pressure inside the trailer had decreased below the PSV activation value, however the PSV did not reseat. Therefore, the hydrogen continued to slowly escape out of the vent stack.

6 hours later, a company employee arrived to the site performed a controlled venting, to reduce the pressure to a safe level and to allow the PSV to reclose. The intervention was successful and the pressure reduced from approximately 170 psi (11.7 bar) to 3-5 psi (0.2 – 0.3 bar).
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Prd (Valve)
How was it involved?
Correct Activation
Initiating cause
Over-Heating (Conventional Fire)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIAL CAUSE was a conventional fire on a truck tyre, which increased the temperature and consequently the pressure of the LH2 tank.
The pressure control system of the trailer functioned as expected. The fire fighting strategy was successful.

Nevertheless, regular inspections, and maintenance and replacement procedures are in place for critical components of heavy duty vehicles. Theese measures should be able to prevent negative consequences to the rest of the system. This is even more important for hazardous material transports. Shortcoming in these procedures could be suggested as ROOT CAUSE.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
LH2 tanker
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
burst disc, vent
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
A conventional fire started on the truck, initiating the series of events.

Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT
The nominal capacity of the trailer was 10500 gallons (2800 kg of LH2)

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
60000
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
The LH2 was almost empty. 80 kg were assessed as vented.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Released amount
80.450416351249
Actual pressure (MPa)
1.2
Design pressure (MPa)
<1.0
Presumed ignition source
Open flame

References

Reference & weblink

Incident E-2013100402 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment