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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire of a hydrogen-rich gas mixture in a fertilizers plant

Event

Event ID
942
Quality
Description
The event occurred on vent stack of an ammonia synthesis unit. The release of the gas was more specifically on the water purge line or the hydraulic guard of the vent stack. The process gas consisting in 75% hydrogen, ignited.
The fire could be extinguished the by the emergency decompression of the unit and the automatic shutdown of the synthetic gas turbocharger.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Europe
Country
France
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
As reported with details the ARIA description (see references), the investigation performed by the plant operator has shown that a series of not-coordinated detection of fluid levels at the exit of the reactor caused an over-pressure in the chimney. This has displaced the liquid content of the hydraulic guard at the bottom of the chimney and some of the syngas passed through the purge line of the guard and ignited. The accidental scenario of syngas emissions from the purge line had not been formally identified by the operator, nevertheless was covered by the general provisions of the emergency plan.

The root cause can be identified in some design, such as the incorrect positioning of the 2 low level sensors installed in the separator, and the dimension of the withdrawal valve.

Facility

Application
Chemical Industry
Sub-application
Ammonia production
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
vent stack, ammonia reactor
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
The material damage was negligible.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Although the ARIA report (see references) does not mention any lesson learnt, the very accurate and detailed findings from the post-accident investigation (see causes) suggest the following corrective actions:
1) to improved sensors location, and the way how their signals are worked out in the safety system of the plant (new HAZOP).
20 to better understand the flow dynamics also in accidental cases and adapt the design of the unit.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Flame type
Other

References

Reference & weblink

Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/41517/<br />
(accessed October 2020)<br />

JRC assessment