Event
- Event ID
- 942
- Quality
- Description
- The event occurred on vent stack of an ammonia synthesis unit. The release of the gas was more specifically on the water purge line or the hydraulic guard of the vent stack. The process gas consisting in 75% hydrogen, ignited.
The fire could be extinguished the by the emergency decompression of the unit and the automatic shutdown of the synthetic gas turbocharger. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- As reported with details the ARIA description (see references), the investigation performed by the plant operator has shown that a series of not-coordinated detection of fluid levels at the exit of the reactor caused an over-pressure in the chimney. This has displaced the liquid content of the hydraulic guard at the bottom of the chimney and some of the syngas passed through the purge line of the guard and ignited. The accidental scenario of syngas emissions from the purge line had not been formally identified by the operator, nevertheless was covered by the general provisions of the emergency plan.
The root cause can be identified in some design, such as the incorrect positioning of the 2 low level sensors installed in the separator, and the dimension of the withdrawal valve.
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Ammonia production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- vent stack, ammonia reactor
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Post-event summary
- The material damage was negligible.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
Although the ARIA report (see references) does not mention any lesson learnt, the very accurate and detailed findings from the post-accident investigation (see causes) suggest the following corrective actions:
1) to improved sensors location, and the way how their signals are worked out in the safety system of the plant (new HAZOP).
20 to better understand the flow dynamics also in accidental cases and adapt the design of the unit.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Flame type
- Other
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/41517/<br />
(accessed October 2020)<br />
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA