Event
- Event ID
- 179
- Quality
- Description
- A release of hydrogen occurred during the filling of a 28 bottles rack. A worker decided to move the rack from one station to another, due to works ongoing nearby. This movement, even though the hose had remained connected to the rack, caused the bracket to break and the compressed hydrogen to leak. The jet was directed against the barrel of cylinders.
Hydrogen sensors triggered the shutdown of the installation, including the closure of the feeding valve.
The worker detached the flexible and started moving the rack towards the water supply. During its route around the building, the leak ignited. He secured the rack on the ground and gave the alarm. - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Fire (No additional details provided)
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Joint/Connection (Hose)
- How was it involved?
- Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Impact, Rollover, Crash
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING cause of the hydrogen release was the pulling away of the rack during filling.
According to the ARIA report (see references), the formal accident investigation found out that the configuration of the filling station did not provide a clear view of the filling hose connection (see lesson learned for corrective actions).
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- glass production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- compressed hydrogen storage, cylinders rack, flexible connection
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- A 28 bottles rack was being filled with compressed hydrogen on a secondary station. The principal station was closed due to works in the surroundings.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Emergency action
- The emergency was combated by means of the refinery's fire-fighting equipment and the local administration fire brigade.
The strategy for fighting the fire consisted in limiting the dangers of the fire spreading and cooling the superstructures that were exposed to heat fluxes, in order to prevent collapse. In addition, the fire was confined by using an extremely high flow rates of water (in the order of 2300 m3/h, at 7 to 8 bar, taken from the site's fire system).
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
The ARIA report (see references) mentions the following corrective actions:
0) the secondary station must be eliminated;
1) the connection between the station and the compressed hydrogen cylinders has to be made visible;
2) Creation of a safety zone where to isolate defective racks or pallets in case of accidents;
3) Purchase of an infrared pyrometer;
4) Installation of a restraint cable fixing ring to the racks;
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- 20
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Flame type
- Other
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/25494/<br />
(accessed October 2020)<br />
<br />Event in the US database H2TOOLS<br />
https://h2tools.org/lessons/incorrectly-sized-safety-valve-results-vent… />
(accessed August 2025)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA