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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire in a desulphurisation unit of a refinery

Event

Event ID
730
Quality
Description
The event occurred at the flanges on the outlet of a desulphurization reactor, which was working under about 300 degrees C. The flanges and bolts were cooled down by a large amount of rainwater which had got into the rain-cover around the flanges.
This caused the material to shrink and made the flanges too tight, putting too much stress on the ring gaskets which deformed and damaged.
As a result, hydrogen gas and light oil mist leaked out and ignited spontaneously, causing damage to pressure gauges and insulation of pipes.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
INITIATING cause was a too high thermo-mechanical stress on flange of a reactor, due thermal gradient induced by rain water.

Possible ROOT CAUSES could be an inadequate risk assessment or safety design, and inadequate operative processes, which failed to protect the installation from rain.

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
hydro-desulphurization unit, flanges and gaskets
Location type
Unknown
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
The operative condition were as usual, but there was a heavy rain several hours before the accident, and a large quantity of rainwater flowed in between the rain cover and the heat-insulating sheet metal.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
Yen
Property loss (onsite)
100000
Post-event summary
A pressure gage and piping heat insulation were damaged by fire.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

There are many cases where insufficient attention is paid to the specific locations of each valve, and its possible lifetime damage patterns. It is only after that an incident took place, that plant management realises the inadequacy of installations.

Corrective Measures

1. Measures to prevent rainwater from flowing around the flange shall be taken.
2. Similar parts of the plant shall be checked as well, and countermeasures should be taken.
3. The procedure of flange tightening force shall be reviewed.

Event Nature

Release type
aerosol
Involved substances (% vol)
H2,
light oil
Presumed ignition source
Auto-ignition

References

Reference & weblink

Originally in RISCAD. Now in the JST Knowledge Failure Database: <br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1200030.html<br />
(accessed Dec 2023)

JRC assessment