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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire at the desulphurisation unit of a refinery

Event

Event ID
569
Quality
Description
The incident occurred at the direct desulfurization unit of heavy oil. A 130×90 mm oval opening occurred in the bypass pipe of the hydrogen sulphide absorption tower for the circulating gas, at a height of about 20 m from ground. The process fluid, consisting mainly of hydrogen, leaked and ignited, causing a fire.
The fire broke out in combination with an explosive noise. It burned a part of the system installed in the site in a range of the radius of about 30 m, and was extinguished after about 10 hours.
The heavy oil supply was stopped, waiting for the complete burning-off of the hydrogen and the heavy oil of about 1,000 kl left in the system.

The fire station dispatched 27 fire engines for chemical fire, fighting the fire by pouring nitrogen in the piping system. The fire was extinguished 10 hours later.

The bypass piping was made ofSTS48-S steel, had a nominal diameter of 10 inches, and a wall thickness of 28.6 mm. The failure occurred at a dead-end branch of the pipe, positioned vertically, which upon inspection resulted extremely corroded and thinned. The cause was supposed to be the consequence of rapid corrosion due to accidental formation of ammonium (hydro)-sulphide from nitrogen, hydrogen and hydrogen sulphide, in presence of condensed water. The operative condition of that part of the pipe were almost stagnation due to absence of flow, temperature variation and humidity variation with consequent cycling condensation/evaporation.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Main component involved?
Pipe
How was it involved?
Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (Internal Corrosion / Erosion)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING cause was the corrosion of the pipe due to accidental formation of corrosive substances from hydrogen, hydrogen sulphide and nitrogen impurities.
The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of effective inspection and of operative feedback which should have contribute to improve the design.

Facility

Application
Petrochemical Industry
Sub-application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
pipe,
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
According to the plant, a plurality of gas detectors sensed abnormality in the area including the high-temperature and high-pressure separation tank to separate heavy oil from gas in a part of the system before the explosion. These were probably casued by the intiation of the leak. The fire broke out while the staff started to check the system.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
Yen
Property loss (onsite)
8000000
Post-event summary
An area of about 30 meters in diameter around the air-cooled cooler of the desulfurization system burned. The damage was preliminarily assessed at about 7 billion to 8 billion yen (ca 45000 Euros).

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Despite the fact that safety measures and safeguards are part of the original plant design, it is important to review their effectiveness during operation. This probably implies a thorough inspections programme.

Corrective Measures

Removal of the bypass pipe.
Inspection of similar pipes of the plant.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Second report JST failures database reporting the same case:<br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/include/fkd_showCase.php?id=CC0200043&text1… />
(accessed Dec 2024)

Picture

Journal of Japan Society for Safety Engineering, Vol.42(2), p.117(2003).<br />
Publicly available at: <br />
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/browse/safety/42/2/_contents<br />
(accessed May 2020)

JRC assessment