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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Fire from a CHG2 trailer during filling

Event

Event ID
1150
Quality
Description
The incident occurred at the site of a gas production company.
During the filling of a compressed hydrogen trailer, an end plug thermal pressure relief device (TPRD) had an unplanned activation. The released hydrogen vented through a leak in the vent manifold of the TPRD venting system, which appeared to be improperly assembled.
The ignition of the hydrogen caused significant damage to the trailer and damage to the another trailer which was being filled alongside the affected trailer.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Tprd
How was it involved?
Premature Activation
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (Generic)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the unexpected activation of a thermal pressure relief device. The reson for this failure is not reported.
The hydrogen releasedby the PRD would hve been vented wihtour further consequence, if the enting system whould not have failed at the manifold.
Therefore, the ROOT CAUSES were a combination of a material failure and a wrong installation of the venting system manifold.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transfer (No additional details provided)
All components affected
TPRD, vent manifold
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
Two other trailers experienced TPRD failures in a similar fashion before, but on separate occurrences and no resulting fire or damage.
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT
The trailer consisted of 50 tubes of type 3, with a composite external shell and a metallic liner.
Specification According to the manufacturer:
nominal pressure 520 bar / 7,500 psig
Cylinder Water Volume 315 litres / 11.1 scf
Total Water Volume 15,750 liters / 555 scf
Hydrogen Capacity 501 kgs / 211,690 scf
(source: https://bayotech.us/bulk-hydrogen-transport-trailers/).
According to PHMSA, the quantity were lower:
Capacity 780 gas-pound (350 kg)
Quantity (300 kg)

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
950000
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
Significant damage to the trailer and damage to the another trailer which was being filled alongside the affected trailer.

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures
Recommended actions: 1. Recall all valves and end-plug TRPDs related to the production lot(s) that have failed to prevent reoccurrence.
2. Valve manufacturer needs to implement a verifiable quality control program for all future valves.
3. Vent manifolding should be pressure tested by the trailer manufacturer before shipping to customers, to identify and fix possible vent manifold leaks.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
52
Design pressure (MPa)
52
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Incident I-2024010030 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: <br />
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%… />
(accessed September 2024)

JRC assessment