Event
- Event ID
- 438
- Quality
- Description
- After completion of a process using hydrogen an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the vent stack. Cold hydrogen gas was being vented into the atmosphere for about 45 minutes. The weather was unusually calm and the gas probably accumulated around the vent stack area and ignited.
[Ordin, NASA (1974)] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Main component involved?
- Venting System (Exit)
- How was it involved?
- Ignition Of Vented H2
- Initiating cause
- Inadequate Or Wrong Design
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of a hydrogen-air flammable mixture at the exit of the vent stack, due to lack of wind able to disperse the hydrogen.
The fact that the safety design of the vent was based on expectation of enough wind, suggests a ROOT CAUSE related to its design.
Facility
- Application
- Non-Road Vehicles
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- vent stack
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Unknown (No additional details provided)
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
- Property loss (offsite)
- 0
- Post-event summary
- Possibley only some damage to stack vent exit
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- A venting system which does not foresee an ignition source at the vent stack exit is bases don the principle of hydrogen dispersion into the atmosphere without formation of explosive mixtures. In this case this theoretical model did not work. The report attributed this failure to the very calm weather. Wind was then a critical component of the dispersion assumption. Probably, also the hydrogen velocity at the stack exit played a role. Without an accurate computational flow dynamics model, is impossible to exclude formation of an explosive atmosphere in all speed and weather conditions (humidity, wind force and direction , etc.).
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Release duration
- unknown
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Ignition delay
- N
References
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 81 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002
Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ORDIN