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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion when venting hydrogen

Event

Event ID
438
Quality
Description
After completion of a process using hydrogen an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the vent stack. Cold hydrogen gas was being vented into the atmosphere for about 45 minutes. The weather was unusually calm and the gas probably accumulated around the vent stack area and ignited.

[Ordin, NASA (1974)]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Main component involved?
Venting System (Exit)
How was it involved?
Ignition Of Vented H2
Initiating cause
Inadequate Or Wrong Design
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of a hydrogen-air flammable mixture at the exit of the vent stack, due to lack of wind able to disperse the hydrogen.

The fact that the safety design of the vent was based on expectation of enough wind, suggests a ROOT CAUSE related to its design.

Facility

Application
Non-Road Vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
vent stack
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Unknown (No additional details provided)

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Property loss (offsite)
0
Post-event summary
Possibley only some damage to stack vent exit

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt
A venting system which does not foresee an ignition source at the vent stack exit is bases don the principle of hydrogen dispersion into the atmosphere without formation of explosive mixtures. In this case this theoretical model did not work. The report attributed this failure to the very calm weather. Wind was then a critical component of the dispersion assumption. Probably, also the hydrogen velocity at the stack exit played a role. Without an accurate computational flow dynamics model, is impossible to exclude formation of an explosive atmosphere in all speed and weather conditions (humidity, wind force and direction , etc.).

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release duration
unknown
Presumed ignition source
Not reported
Ignition delay
N

References

Reference & weblink

Mishap no 81 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)

JRC assessment