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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in a vent stack of a rocket testing facility

Event

Event ID
432
Quality
Description
During welding of a pipe to an existing header vent system, hydrogen gas was ignited. The adjacent vessels and lines were inerted with helium and a hydrogen detection check did not indicate presence of hydrogen. The cutting was re-started and a hole was made in the header. The area was then cleared to permit a test to be conducted in a separate facility after which work on the header was continued. In striking an arc for welding, ignition of H2 gas exiting from the hole in the header resulted.

[Ordin, NASA (1974)]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Main component involved?
Venting System (Valve)
How was it involved?
Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
Initiating cause
Inadequate Or No Purge
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
A common hydrogen vent system was used and an upstream hand-operated shut off valve was malfunctioning. Hydrogen continued to leak through that valve into the header.
IGNITION SOURCE was the welding arc.

The ROOT CAUSE can only be guessed as inadequate inspection of equipment.

Facility

Application
Non-Road Vehicles
Sub-application
Aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Storage (No additional details provided)
All components affected
header, vent stack
Location type
Unknown
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
WHAT IS A VENT HEADER?
A gas vent system header is a main horizontal pipe that collects gases from multiple smaller vents, such as those from appliances, storage tanks, or reactors. It is designed to safely transport these gases to a single, larger vent stack or treatment system. This central pipe consolidates emissions, allowing for more efficient control and disposal, and may also be used to direct gas to processes like a flare.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Post-event summary
Damage probaly only the cost of the gauge

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release duration
immediate
Release rate
n.a.
Presumed ignition source
Welding
Ignition delay
N

References

Reference & weblink

Mishap no 72 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)

JRC assessment