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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Explosion in a silicon crystal growing reactor

Event

Event ID
476
Quality
Description
The incident happened in an a reactor for silicon crystal growing of electronic-grade. An explosion was located in scrubber tank of the facility, due to an increase of hydrogen in the entrainment separator.

[Zalosh and Short, 1978]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
Main component involved?
Chemical Storage Tank
How was it involved?
Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
Initiating cause
Wrong Operation
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The increase in hydrogen concentration was triggered by the shutdown of the scrubber including the exhaust fan. Therefore the ROOT CAUSE could be tentatively attributed to an inadequate safety design, unable to guarantee continuous availablity of critical components (in this case, the capacity to vent)

Facility

Application
Electronics And Micro-Electronics
Sub-application
single crystal growing
Hydrogen supply chain stage
All components affected
scrubber tanl
Location type
Confined
Location description
Unknown
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
To produce epitaxial silicon, a silicon-containing gas, such as trichlorosilane (SiHCl3) is introduced into the reaction chamber along with a carrier gas, usually hydrogen as ultra-high-purity carrier gas and chemical reducing agent. The reaction process gases are then sent to a scrubber, to capture and neutralize hazardous, toxic, and corrosive gases produced during the epitaxial deposition process (mainly hydrochloric acid HCl, Silanes SiH₄, rest of chlorosilanes, silicon oxides (particulates rest of the dopant precursors, such as arsine AsH₃ and phosphine PH₃). These substances are separated from the gas stream by reactive chemical liquids, usually an acidic or basic aqueous solution, and collected in a scrubber tank, while hydrogen is sent to the venting system.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Currency
US$
Property loss (onsite)
5000

Event Nature

Release type
gas mixture
Ignition delay
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Table II - Industrial Incidents of Appendix A of Zalosh and Short<br />
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENTS<br />
Quarterly Report No. 2 for Period December 1, 1977 - February 28, 1978<br />
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6566131<br />
(accessed September 2020)

JRC assessment