Event
- Event ID
- 335
- Quality
- Description
- An explosion occurred during tensile tests of metals in a liquid hydrogen vessel. efforts were made to prevent air from entering by using a flexible top skirt designed to allow for movement of the tensile machine. A purge was also applied at each testing cycle.
[Ordin, NASA (1974)] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- -
- Main component involved?
- Cryogenic Vessel
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Inadequate Or No Purge
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an air-hydrogen explosive mixture inside the liquid hydrogen apparatus, and the following ignition .
The most probable cause was air which had condensed in the LH2 vessels system due to leaks. This air was most likely solidified and collected in the bottom of the vessel. Purging after each test did not warm the vessel sufficiently to remove the air. Fracturing of the specimen probably provided sufficient energy for ignition.
ROOT CAUSE could be then identified in an inadequate procedure applied at the end of the test and aiming to purge completely the testing vessel. Moreover, it should be possible to identify the presence of frozen ai inside the vessel by simple visual inspection. The fact that air could leak into the vessel speaks for a shortcoming of the design.
Facility
- Application
- Laboratory / R&d
- Sub-application
- Aerospace
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- dewar
- Location type
- Unknown
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- It is not completely clear when exactly the explosion took place.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- 0
Event Nature
- Release type
- liquid
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 100%
- Actual pressure (MPa)
- <1.0
- Design pressure (MPa)
- <1.0
- Presumed ignition source
- Mechanical sparks
References
- Reference & weblink
Mishap no 42 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002
Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)Hankinson and Lowesmith, HAZIDs for Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation , FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.11 (2013)<br />
https://www.idealhy.eu/uploads/documents/IDEALHY_D3-10%20HAZIDs_Liquefa… />
(Only summary publicly available, accessed October 2025)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ORDIN